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The proposal that there are important parallels to be drawn between 
children's cognitive development and the development of knowledge in 
science, has prompted a growing interest in the idea that in their interactions 
with the world young children can be profitably viewed as intuitive scientists. 
This study sets out to investigate the metaphor of the child as an intuitive 
scientist by undertaking a detailed examination of both science and 
children's commonsense thought, and in so doing, demonstrate the utility of 
the metaphor for developmental inquiry. Chapter 1 addresses the nature of 
science and the importance of selecting an appropriate model of scientific 
rationality as the basis for assessments of childhood thought. A realist 
theory of science is adopted as the most adequate account of scientific 
inquiry and hence the most appropriate framework with which to pursue 
child-scientist comparisons. Chapter 2 turns to lay cognition and looks to 
establish the theoretical status of folk psychology in light of recent claims that 
a theory is not necessary for comprehending human action. In Chapter 3 the 
focus turns to young children's knowledge and the question of 
correspondences with scientific thought. Research detailing the child's 
development of an understanding of mind is highlighted, indicating that in 
both the content of their knowledge and in the processes by which such 
knowledge is advanced, children bear a striking resemblance to scientists. 
Having demonstrated the plausibility of the child-as-scientist metaphor, 
Chapter 4 looks at ways to further develop child-scientist comparisons in 
order to achieve a valuable perspective on knowledge acquisition in 
childhood. Existing approaches to developing the metaphor are evaluated 
and in light of their limitations an alternative formulation is drafted, which 
argues that a focus on children's methods of inquiry informed by a realist 
perspective on science, constitutes the most profitable approach to 
developing the child-as-scientist metaphor. This study concludes that the 
metaphor of the child as an intuitive scientist with 'science' understood in 
realist terms, is a plausible metaphor for developmental inquiry to pursue. 
More specifically, by refocussing child-scientist comparisons at the 
methodological level and drawing on a comprehensive theory of scientific 
method to inform such comparisons, this study provides some directives as 
to how such a research program might best proceed. 
" ... one might argue that institutionalised science itself is simply a specialised 
form of a more general epistemological project that we are all engaged in from 
infancy." 
Alison Gopnik, 1990 
Introduction 
During childhood, in particular the first five years of life, there occurs a veritable 
watershed in the development of children's understanding about themselves and 
about the world in which they live. Questions concerning how best to 
characterise this development, have sustained research interest since Piaget's 
investigations were published in 'The child's conception of the world'.* Nearly 60 
yeais on, psychologists continue to focus on many of the same developmental 
phenomena that so intrigued Piaget. Increasingly however, the research 
literature has witnessed a move away from Piagetian descriptions of 
development in terms of a fixed set of cognitive states, and towards an emphasis 
on viewing conceptual development in children as analogous in many respects 
to the growth of knowledge in science. For some researchers, this proposed 
science-commonsense relation has entailed an appeal to theoretical knowledge 
structures as a useful source of information regarding the ways in which 
children's commonsense knowledge is organised (Carey, 1985b; Wellman, 
1990). Others have found it attractive to view cognitive development as a 
process of theory formation, similar to the process by which understanding is 
advanced in science (Karmiloff-Smith, 1988; Gopnik, 1993). Within this 
framework, the metaphor of the child as an intuitive scientist has emerged as a 
profitable way of conceptualising children's interaction with the world and their 
development of knowledge. 
This study sets out to investigate the hypothesis underlying the child-as-scientist 
metaphor, namely that there are important parallels to be drawn between 
children's cognitive development and the development of knowledge in science. 
By drawing these parallels this work will attempt to demonstrate the utility of this 
metaphor in advancing our understanding of the processes by which children 
learn about the world. 
With this goal in mind, it would seem useful to begin by briefly situating the child-
as-scientist metaphor within a broader theoretical context. Indeed, this shift in 
the developmental literature which looks to draw informative parallels between 
children's knowledge acquisition and science, is perhaps best interpreted as part 
of a more general change in research attitude towards the layperson and their 
* Originally published 1926 - 'La representation du monde chez l'enfant'. Paris: Alcan. First 
published in the English language 1929 - London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
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capacity for reasoning. A dominant perspective in psychology has for a number 
of years served to promote the view that laypeople are poor or ineffectual 
problem solvers who display numerous biases in their everyday attempts to 
reason about the world (Kahneman, Slavic & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980). Within this tradition, researchers investigating people's inferential 
strategies have typically concentrated on an explication of these biases, 
appealing to normative models in order to expose the lack of fit between such 
models and everyday judgement (see Gigerenzer et al (1989) for a case study of 
the 'judgement under uncertainty' research program headed by Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slavic and Amos Tversky, in which the majority of research 
energy has been channelled into explaining discrepancies between human 
reasoning and probability theory). 
This method of studying lay cognition by focusing on inferential errors, is 
predicated on the assumption that the nature of the human cognitive machine is 
best revealed through an examination of the defects or "program errors" it 
produces (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). However as Kahneman, Slavic & Tversky 
(1982) acknowledge, in the construction of an 'error focused' research program, 
'the method' has to a large extent come to determine 'the message' regarding 
our natural capacity for rational thought. Investigations arguing for example that 
children and lay adults retain commitments to ideas in the face of disconfirmatory 
evidence (Kuhn, 1989), overestimate the causal role of dispositional factors in 
matters of social judgement while underestimating the contribution of situational 
factors (Ross, 1977), fail to reason in accordance with the principles of Bayesian 
inferential statistics (Kahneman, Slavic & Tversky, 1982), and generally display a 
strong bias for verification in their everyday attempts to comprehend the world 
(Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972), have not surprisingly, resulted in an unflattering 
portrait of the layperson as reasoner. Compared with the rational reasoning 
strategies typically attributed to scientists, laypeople have been diagnosed with 
multiple inferential shortcomings, and as a consequence of these shortcomings 
seen to fall prey to irrational and error-prone judgements in their commonsense 
dealings with the world. 
Recently however, this negative perception of the layperson has begun to 
change (e.g. Holland et al, 1986). A growing consensus on commonsense 
cognition spanning the disciplines of developmental and social psychology, 
cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of science, now indicates 
that given the 'tools' we might reasonably expect are required, laypeople (both 
children and lay adults) perform very well in problem solving tasks and are 
generally adept at extracting information from their surroundings. This move 
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towards a more optimistic view of lay rationality is perhaps best seen by looking 
across a range of recent studies on children's everyday problem solving. In 
these studies, researchers have diverged from the common practice of 
measuring lay judgment against normative models of statistical or logical 
inference, and instead looked to examine the strategies that are available to 
children for comprehending the world. Findings provide good cause for 
optimism regarding our natural inferential capacities, since they indicate that 
even very young children demonstrate the ability to reason causally (Brown, 
1990), make valid inductive inferences (Gelman & Markman, 1986), develop 
their knowledge of poorly understood phenomena via analogical extension 
(Vosniadou, 1989), differentiate and coordinate ideas and evidence in an 
appropriate fashion (Sodian et al, 1991 ), and draw on a range of meta-
conceptual criteria to appraise the explanatory coherence of competing 
explanations (Samarapungavan, 1992). More generally, children have been 
found to display powerful theory formation abilities, which allow them to simplify 
and unify incoming information into coherent conceptions and thereby obtain a 
representational 'handle' on the world (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; ~<armiloff-
Smith, 1988; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994). 
Collectively, these studies can be seen to provide support for the view that 
laypeople have the capacity for complex reasoning, since they indicate that even 
young children have at their disposal a range of effective strategies for making 
sense of phenomena. This revised estimation of the layperson as a 
methodologically adept creature, is further promoted in the work of Holland et al 
(1986). In their attempts to construct a systematic approach to the study of 
induction, these authors present a theoretical framework that treats everyday 
problem solving and scientific discovery as fundamentally the same sort of 
process, to be explained in terms of rule based mental models. Discussing 
learning in scientific and everyday contexts in this manner, by utilising a common 
interpretative framework, not only serves to raise the perceived rationality of 
commonsense thought, it simultaneously demands a reassessment of the 
traditionally accepted division of science and commonsense. In turn such a 
reconceptualisation of lay cognition, paves the way for potentially informative 
parallels to be drawn between children and scientists. 
It is with the intention of drawing these parallels that this study begins in Chapter 
1 by addressing the nature of science and the importance of choosing an 
appropriate model of scientific rationality as a 'standard' for children's thought. In 
the main, researchers investigating child-scientist relations have, it will be 
argued, failed to give adequate attention to the account of science underlying 
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their arguments. This is despite the fact that the model of scientific rationality 
operating in these studies effectively determines subsequent estimations of 
children's capacities for rational thought. Recognising that the validity of 
conclusions regarding children's competencies depends crucially on the validity 
of the scientific framework invoked however, demonstrates the necessity of 
addressing this imbalance in the developmental literature. The rationale for 
Chapter 1 then, is firstly to determine the account of science that has to date 
undergirded researchers' estimations of children's capabilities, and secondly to 
assess its suitability as an appropriate framework for child-scientist comparisons. 
On investigation, it is argued that an empiricist account of science forms the 
predominant framework in evaluations of the scientific nature of children's 
thought. By way of appealing to contemporary commentary in the philosophy of 
science, an attempt will be made to highlight the deficiencies inherent in this 
philosophical framework, most notably its failure to provide a realistic account of 
scientific inquiry, and hence its unsuitability for the role of scientific standard in 
the child-as-scientist debate. Rejecting the scientific basis utilised by the majority 
of developmentalists in their investigations, demands that an adequate 
alternative be supplied. This is provided in this study in the form of a realist 
account of science, known as "Evolutionary Naturalistic Realism". The remainder 
of the chapter looks to outline this theory of scientific endeavour, and in so doing 
sketch an appropriate philosophical base for the treatment of the child-as-
scientist metaphor which is to follow. 
With an appropriate scientific framework in place, Chapter 2 turns to lay cognition 
and the question of similarities with scientific thought. In this chapter, an effort 
will be made to establish the theoretical status of our everyday psychological 
understanding or folk psychology as a necessary precursor to arguing that 
theoretical knowledge is common to children and scientists alike. This involves 
resisting two dominant challenges that have been mounted against the proposal 
that our folk psychological understanding constitutes a genuine empirical theory. 
The first body of criticism argues that in terms of both its structure and the way in 
which it functions in everyday life, folk psychology fails to correspond with 
theories in science. Working from a realistic perspective on scientific inquiry 
however, it will be suggested that such criticisms can be seen to stem from an 
inappropriately narrow rendering of theory, supported by a tacit commitment to 
an empiricist view of science. In attempting to disarm such a challenge, folk 
psychology is seen to be unveiled as a commonsense theoretical framework, 
whose status as a theory is arguably justified by its explanatory and predictive 
success in the everyday domain in which it functions. 
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The second dominant challenge to the theory view, takes the form of an 
alternative account of our everyday psychological knowledge. On this account, a 
'theory' is deemed unnecessary for comprehending human action, since in 
looking to explain and predict each other's action it is suggested that we simply 
draw on the resources of our own minds to 'simulate' the workings of others. By 
undertaking a comparative evaluation of these two theoretical explanations 
along a number of dimensions however, a case will be made for the claim that 
simulation theory does not constitute a direct challenge to the theory view of folk 
psychology. Rather, it will be argued that simulation is best perceived as a skill 
or capacity, which is insufficient in itself to provide explanatory understanding, 
but when conjoined with other strategies enables us to acquire a commonsense 
theory of mind. 
Having looked to establish an appropriate scientific framework within which to 
situate child-scientist comparisons, and to indicate the theoretical nature of our 
commonsense model for understanding human action, the focus shifts in 
Chapter 3 to young children's knowledge and the extent to which comparisons 
can be made between the young child and the scientist. Recognising that the 
child-as-scientist metaphor embodies a perspective on children's knowledge 
construction abilities which diverges sharply from traditional depictions of 
children's thought, a primary concern of this chapter is to discover whether in 
light of recent developmental research the metaphor can be maintained. 
Drawing on a comprehensive body of literature detailing the child's development 
of an understanding of mind, evidence will be highlighted which indicates that 
general parallels do exist between children and scientists in terms of both the 
theoretical nature of their knowledge and the process by which such knowledge 
undergoes development. 
Having sought to establish the plausibility of the child-as-scientist metaphor by 
addressing the nature of science, the nature of lay cognition, and the nature of 
childhood thought, Chapter 4 looks to analyse the implications of this metaphor 
for the development of knowledge in science. Accordingly, the chapter will begin 
with a consideration of how child-scientist relations have been developed to 
date, in terms of parallels between the growth of knowledge in children and the 
growth of knowledge in the history of science. Attention in this section is given to 
two different approaches to developing the child-as-scientist metaphor via 
'history-of-science' comparisons, and limitations of each are highlighted. 
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Following this critical evaluation, a reconceptualisation of the metaphor will be 
undertaken in which it is argued that a focus on the methods of inquiry utilised by 
children informed by a realist perspective on science, constitutes the most 
profitable approach to developing the child-as-scientist metaphor. A general 
theory of scientific method consistent with Evolutionary Naturalistic Realism is 
outlined for this purpose, and compelling similarities between children's methods 
of inquiry and this realistic account of scientific endeavour are brought to the 
reader's attention. Given these similarities, this study concludes that the 
metaphor of the child as an intuitive scientist with 'science' understood in realist 
terms, provides researchers with an informative characterisation of cognitive 
development. More specifically, by refocussing child-scientist comparisons at 
the methodological level, this work indicates the potential of drawing on a 
comprehensive theory of method designed to illuminate the process of 




The nature of science 
Establishing an appropriate framework 
Comparisons in the literature between children and scientists have generally 
speaking been disproportionate in their analyses. That is, in comparing 
children's problem-solving strategies with the processes operative in scientific 
discovery, few researchers have explicitly acknowledged the general account of 
science they are working from. Effectively, science has been taken as a 'given' 
in the equation, functioning as a fixed standard of rationality against which to 
assess children's reasoning. 
However, examining the nature of science would seem crucial to any serious 
analysis of the child-as-scientist model, since adherence to a particular model of 
science will largely determine one's perspective on the character of childhood 
thought. The importance of choosing an appropriate model of scientific 
rationality is therefore tantamount to the validity of research in this field. For as 
Byrnes (1993) points out, if the standard used to assess the quality of thinking in 
childhood is questionable, then any process of comparison that rests on this 
standard, is essentially misguided. 
This study of the child-as-scientist metaphor takes as its point of departure the 
ass·umption that any assessment of knowledge development in children 
necessarily includes an assessment of the scientific standards by which we 
judge their knowledge. Accordingly, Chapter One will seek to address the 
following issues. Firstly, attention will be given to outlining how an empiricist 
account of science has underscored arguments in the child-as-scientist literature, 
and how its inadequacy in capturing the reality of scientific practice makes it an 
unsuitable philosophical framework for research in this area. Having rejected an 
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empiricist framework, consideration will be given to a realist account of science, 
specifically Evolutionary Naturalistic Realism as championed by Hooker (1987). 
This alternative view is adopted in this study as the most realistic portrayal of 
scientific endeavour and hence as the most appropriate philosophical base from 
which to examine similarities between children and scientists. 
1.1 The child as scientist : current 
characterisations 
The idea that science has the potential to provide a 'window' on cognitive 
development, has propelled researchers to investigate the ways in which 
children can be seen as intuitive scientists. As a result, two important aspects of 
scientific endeavour have emerged as focal points of interest in the child-as-
scientist debate. The first, concerns the fact that knowledge in science inheres in 
theories. Traditionally, a sharp distinction has been drawn between theoretical 
and non-theoretical knowledge, with childhood thought falling squarely in the 
latter category. Recently however, a growing number of psychologists have 
persuasively argued that children possess coherent bodies of knowledge that 
bear marked resemblances to theoretical structures in science. The concern in 
these investigations then, is with the content of children's knowledge and 
whether it is conceivable that children be credited with something akin to a 
scientific theory. 
The second aspect of scientific endeavour lending itself to comparison with 
children's thought, concerns the methods by which knowledge is generated in 
science. While much debate has focused on the theoretical status of children's 
knowledge, far less research attention has been directed towards examining 
possible similarities between children and scientists in terms of the process of 
knowledge construction. Such reluctance is not surprising given the traditional 
conception of the objective scientist who operates by applying the laws of formal 
logic; a depiction of scientific inquiry which seems far removed from the everyday 
problem solving activities of the young child. However, an increasing concern 
with how scientists do operate in their day to day practice, together with micro-
developmental studies of knowledge formation in children, has led some 
researchers to suggest that the commonsense methods of inquiry children 
demonstrate are analogous in many respects to the processes employed to 
promote scientific discovery. 
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A concern with scientific theories and scientific method then, constitute two 
important ways in which the child can potentially be viewed as an intuitive 
scientist. In debating these two analogies between science and commonsense 
however, researchers have given scant attention to the general account of 
science underpinning their arguments. Essentially, specific ideas regarding 
theories and scientific reasoning have been imported into the child-as-scientist 
debate, without any consideration of the wider philosophical framework on which 
they depend. Here an outline of the child-as-scientist literature will be given in 
an attempt to situate the characterisations of theories and scientific method within 
a more general account of science, and so better appreciate the scientific 
standards underlying researchers' evaluations of children's knowledge. 
1.1.1 Scientific theories 
The slogan 'children's theories of mind' has come to identify a body of 
psychological research that draws on the notion of a theory in order to explicate 
children's development of an understanding of mind. According to this view, the 
young child's ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs and desires to 
themselves and to others as a way of making sense of behaviour, is dependent 
on an implicit theory which is formed somewhere between the ages of 3 and 5 
years. While a 'theory perspective' on children's psychological knowledge has 
become a dominant view in developmental psychology, the widespread 
application of the 'theory-of-mind' slogan is, as Astington and Gopnik (1991) 
point out, also a reflection of the fact that 'theory' is used by many researchers as 
a catch-all term for any organised body of knowledge. As a result much of the 
current debate concerning the theoretical account of children's understanding is 
hopelessly imprecise, to the extent that different researchers appear to be 
drawing quite different conclusions when they impute a theory to the young child. 
Some researchers (Gopnik, '1990; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990) have 
responded to this situation by arguing for a stronger, more highly structured 
notion of a theory, that draws close analogies between scientific theories and 
children's folk psychology. However, as Wellman (1990) points out, this task is 
made difficult by the lack of consensus concerning the nature of scientific 
theories in philosophy of science. Because questions surrounding an 
appropriate portrayal of scientific theories remain unresolved, different 
researchers have tended to focus on different features to support their views. Of 
interest to this study is the marked division on the question of what characterises 
scientific theories between those who argue for the theoretical account of 
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children's understanding, and those who endorse a contrasting non-theoretical 
account such as simulation. For these two opposing camps the so-called 
"defining features" of scientific theories vary in significant ways. 
Of those who endorse a developmental version of the "theory-theory" (Morton, 
1980), namely the view that our folk psychological understandings comprise a 
theory, Wellman (1990) provides the most concerted attempt to define the nature 
of the relation between commonsense understanding and scientific theories. 
Borrowing from the philosophy of science he argues that three criteria must be 
met in order to justify the use of the term 'theory'. Firstly, theories in science are 
seen to be characterised by a type of coherence that serves to distinguish them 
from other forms of knowledge. Theories are not simply a loosely grouped bunch 
of facts or beliefs, rather they demonstrate a unity or interconnectedness, 
whereby the concepts or theoretical terms encompassed by the theory are more 
or less defined by their place in a web of constructs. Other researchers 
advocating the theory-of-mind view similarly emphasise coherence as a 
characteristic feature of scientific theories. For example Gopnik (1993) draws on 
the coherency of children's psychological understanding as an interlocking body 
of beliefs to endorse its theoretical status. 
The second aspect of theories cited by Wellman, is that they specify the kinds of 
entities that exist in the domain in question. That is, theories necessarily include 
and rest upon specific ontological distinctions or commitments. For example our 
commonsense psychology effectively partitions the world into two ontologically 
distinct categories: the internal mental realm and the external physical realm. 
The importance of this feature to any characterisation of theories can, Wellman 
claims, be seen by considering how impossible it would be to argue that young 
children should be credited with a theory of mind, if they demonstrate no 
appreciation of the basic ontological distinction between 'mind' and 'matter'. 
Thirdly, Wellman proposes that a theory invokes and provides us with "a causal-
explanatory framework to account for, make understandable, and make 
predictable phenomena in its domain" (1988, p.66). That a theory supplies us 
with a causal-explanatory scheme with which to understand the domain in 
question, is according to Wellman, fundamental to even the most basic notion of 
a theory. While often not defining this feature in explicit terms, most researchers 
endorsing the theory view would seem to agree, pointing to the ways in which 
children utilise their folk psychological knowledge to explain and predict 
people's actions in order to support their arguments for a theory of mind. 
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The three features highlighted by Wellman serve to provide us with an initial 
conception of how scientific theories are conceptualised by those researchers 
who argue that the young child should be credited with a theory of mind. 
However, Wellman (1990) gives further definition to his theoretical 
characterisation of children's knowledge, by suggesting that our commonsense 
understanding of mind is best viewed as a framework theory. 
In contrast to specific conceptual structures, large scale or framework theories 
can be seen to deal with more global concerns. Put simply, they serve to frame 
specific theories by defining a domain including its ontology, the causal devices 
in operation, as well as providing some constraints on what will feature as a 
legitimate methodology. Another characteristic of framework theories important 
to Wellman's argument is that they are relatively protected from empirical test. 
While specific theories find themselves exposed to the possibility of empirical 
refutation, the grounding assumptions underwriting such theories usually only 
come under scrutiny in revolutionary periods of science, which witness the 
complete overhaul of a framework or theoretical tradition and its replacement 
with a superior alternative. Many philosophers have highlighted the significant 
role these large scale theories play in science, variously referring to them as 
'paradigms' (Kuhn, 1970), 'research programmes' (Lakatos, 1970), 'global 
theories' (Hooker, 1975), and 'research traditions' (Laudan, 1977). Examples of 
framework theories include Newtonian mechanics in physics, evolutionary theory 
in biology, and cognitivism in psychology. 
In Wellman's view, the most appropriate level at which to compare children's 
psychological knowledge with scientific knowledge is at the level of framework 
theories; indeed, it is in this sense that he conceives our everyday psychological 
understanding as comprising a theory of mind. Like its framework theoretical 
counterparts in science, folk psychology can be characterised in terms of its 
global features; that is, as constituting an ontology (the mind), a causal-
explanatory infrastructure (belief-desire reasoning), and as providing a framing 
device within which to house more specific conceptual structures. More 
generally, by indicating the importance of global theories to the scientific 
enterprise and by arguing that children also endorse framework theories in their 
everyday endeavours, Wellman highlights a significant way in which children are 
like scientists. 
A very different characterisation of scientific theories emerges in the work of 
those researchers who reject a theoretical account of children's psychological 
understanding. Harris (1989) and Johnson (1988) for example, argue that it is 
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implausible to talk of the child possessing an implicit theory. While they accept 
that in some "trivial" sense all knowledge is theoretical knowledge, both 
researchers view the stronger analogy between children's psychological 
understanding and scientific theories, to be misguided. Children do genuinely 
learn about the mind according to Harris and Johnson, but this knowledge is best 
described as 'intuitive' rather than 'theory-like'. 
What features of scientific theories are called upon to support this blanket 
rejection of the analogy between theoretical knowledge and children's 
understanding? In contrast to Wellman's concern with the global features of folk 
psychology that are suggestive of its framework theoretical status, those 
opposing the theory view of mind focus on the explicit nature of scientific 
theories; the fact that they are used by scientists in their attempts to order 
evidence, as opposed to operating implicitly; and that they are compiled by a 
process of stringent formalisation and testing peculiar to institutionalised science. 
The most prominent feature of scientific theories alluded to by those rejecting the 
theoretical view of children's understanding, concerns their formal structure. 
Theories on a mathematical model have traditionally been viewed as comprising 
an axiomatic system where the theoretical postulates are connected in a lawful 
manner with statements about observable phenomena via various 
correspondence rules. On this characterisation then, scientific theories are seen 
to be very different sorts of structures to the cognitive structures encompassing 
children's commonsense psychological understanding. 
1.1.2 Theories and theorising : dividing 'content' from 
'process' 
Up to this point, scientific theories have been considered from rather a static 
point of view; the resulting characterisation being one of an entity or fixed 
knowledge structure. However, one of the most important aspects of theories is 
surely that they undergo development - a quality not captured by the 'entity' 
characterisations outlined above. Gopnik and Wellman (1992) address this 
imbalance in the literature by proposing that any meaningful characterisation of 
scientific theories necessarily involves consideration of the more dynamic, 
procedural aspects of theories, namely those processes involved in theory 
formation and change. 
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In their 1992 paper entitled "Why the Child's Theory of Mind Really Na Theory", 
Gopnik and Wellman turn their attention to theory change. While not providing a 
prescription for such change, these researchers suggest that certain 
"characteristic intermediate processes" can be discerned in the work of scientists, 
who are involved in the transition from one theory to another. Briefly stated, 
theory change will often be preceded by an accumulation of evidence that runs 
counter to the theory in question. Initially, the importance of attending to such 
counter examples may be denied, and the evidence ignored. Eventually the 
need to account for such evidence will be acknowledged, often by developing 
various auxiliary hypotheses to deal with the specific anomalies at issue. Such 
auxiliary hypotheses however are cumbersome and over time rob the theory of 
its earlier simplicity or elegance. A final step in the transition involves the 
construction of an alternative view to the original theory, which may at first be 
applied in a relatively limited manner, and only later recognised to provide a 
coherent account of both the anomalies and the evidence explained by the 
earlier theory. 
Despite the possible advantages accrued from utilising what appears to be a 
more meaningful characterisation of scientific theories, the majority of 
researchers seem decidedly unwilling to consider similarities between scientists 
and children in terms of the process by which their respective theories are 
revised. That is, of those who endorse the theory view of mind, few it seems are 
also willing to credit the young child with the rationality of the scientist. Zaitchik 
and Samet (1993) to take one example, are prepared to accept that the child's 
understanding of mind be seen as a theory in some structural sense, but reject 
outright Gopnik's (1993) assertion that it is arrived at via a process of theorising. 
In their view, the child's theory of mind is neither refutable nor revisable, nor is it 
constructed from evidence. 
Similarly, Deanna Kuhn (1989) accepts the possibility that both child and 
scientist may gain understanding of the world through theories, but claims that 
the analogy pertaining to the method/inquiry side of science is fundamentally 
misleading. The processes by which children and scientists go about exploring 
the world, generating and interpreting the data that will inform their mental 
models, are in Kuhn's view, not comparable. In short, this view indicates that 
while young children may well hold theories, such theories are divorced from any 
process approximating scientific reasoning. Just why researchers are 
committing themselves to the position that children form theories but do not 
utilise a similar method of theorising to scientists, would seem an important 
1 3 
question to ask. And it appears that in part, the answer lies in a commitment to 
the commonplace empiricist view of what it is to do science. 
1.1.3 Scientific Method 
In her analysis of intuitive scientific activity, Kuhn (1989) explicitly denies that lay 
people .demonstrate the forms of reasoning utilised by professional scientists. 
According to Kuhn, scientific thinking is essentially characterised in terms of the 
progressive differentiation and co-ordination of theory and evidence. Scientists 
demonstrate the ability to consciously articulate their theories; they evidence 
knowledge of the logical relation holding between theories and empirical data; 
they can distinguish what evidence provides support for the theory under 
examination and what evidence contradicts it; and they are able to provide 
justification for their acceptance of the theory in question in terms of its empirical 
adequacy. In contrast to performance by scientists, Kuhn cites findings indicating 
that these skills in relating evidence to theories are seriously underdeveloped in 
children and many lay adults. She concludes that children do not reason like 
scientists, rather scientific thinking processes follow a developmental path. In 
Kuhn's view it is the "instruments of scientific thinking, not just the products that 
undergo strong restructuring" (1989, p.688). 
In making such claims, Kuhn seems to be working off an empiricist account of 
scientific method that promotes empirical testing and an appeal to logic as the 
hallmarks of scientific endeavour. To illustrate, Kuhn's standard of scientific 
method which she uses to assess lay thought, is constructed solely with 
reference to the justification of knowledge claims. There is no talk of the methods 
utilised by scientists in generating theories; nor of the processes by which newly 
generated theories are developed. In short, Kuhn appears to take a decidedly 
narrow view of what it is to do science, articulating her standard of scientific 
thought in terms of the processes operative in one subcontext of scientific inquiry. 
Moreover, within this narrow context, Kuhn assumes that scientists are 
exclusively involved in the process of revising their theories by subjecting them 
to empirical test. No consideration is given to viewing theory appraisal as a 
multi-criteria! affair, in which theories are evaluated on more than merely their 
predictive accuracy. 
Tied to her concern with testing for empirical adequacy as representative of the 
processes involved in scientific inquiry, is Kuhn's conceptualisation of scientific 
reasoning in terms of formal logic. Indeed her assessment of children as 
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deficient reasoners seems to be based on the assumption that science functions 
by deploying special types of logical reasoning that are fundamentally distinct 
from the reasoning processes employed by nonscientists. Certainly the fact that 
the so called 'expert reasoners' in Kuhn's studies were Phd candidates in 
philosophy, provides some indication of the degree to which she views logical 
models of reasoning as constitutive of scientific thought. 
A similar account of scientific method would seem to underlie claims by other 
researchers that the child is a 'nonscientist'. For example those opposing the 
theory view of mind (Harris, 1989; Johnson, 1988), do so in part because 
theories are seen to be compiled by a process of stringent formalisation and 
testing, peculiar to institutionalised science. Indeed this empiricist model of 
scientific inquiry appears to be so strongly adhered to, that even a researcher 
such as Wellman who emphasises the existence of theoretical knowledge in very 
young children, has in the past denied that this knowledge is acquired by a 
process similar to scientific theorising. In fact his proposal that the child's theory 
of mind be seen as a framework theory, appears motivated at least in part by the 
desire to avoid process considerations, and to reconcile his theory of mind claim 
with the following view: 1 
"Children do not craft their theories on the basis of explicit, rigorous activities akin 
to scientific formulation and test ... most of our commonsense theories are 
acquired by processes of everyday knowledge acquisition in childhood. These 
processes are not well understood, but they surely are not the processes of 
formulation and testing employed in scientific theorising" (Wellman, 1990, 
p.130). 
In sum, because of their commitment to an empiricist account of scientific 
endeavour, very few researchers are willing to credit the young child with the 
rationality of the scientist. Even Wellman who is committed to the theory view of 
mind, rejects the proposal that this knowledge is acquired by a process akin to 
scientific reasoning. In effect an empiricist account of scientific rationality 
operates in the majority of the child-as-scientist literature as a fixed 
uncontroversial standard against which children's thought is assessed and 
declared substandard. However the appropriateness of this scientific theory in 
providing a realistic account of scientific inquiry goes largely unquestioned. 
1 This is despite the fact that there is a methodology component to such theories; a component 
which Wellman not surprisingly refrains from discussing. 
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1.2 Empiricist science : a questionable standard 
of scientific rationality 
"The idea that mathematical or logical reasoning provides the paradigm of 
rationality goes back at least as far as Plato. And it was of course, the ideal of a 
logical system that provided a main inspiration for logical empiricism" (Giere, 
1988, p.176). 
As diagnosed in the previous section, the reluctance by many researchers to 
accept the child-as-scientist model can be seen to stem from their commitment to 
an empiricist account of science. Whether or not this is an appropriate account of 
scientific endeavour on which to base comparisons is an issue that remains 
untouched in the child-as-scientist literature. In this section an attempt will be 
made to tackle this question by turning to what philosophers of science have had 
to say regarding the capabilities of this theory in capturing the reality of scientific 
practice. The critical evaluation that follows is not intended as a full scale assault 
on logical empiricism (for a particularly clear extended critique see Hooker, 
1987). Rather, attention will be focused on the features of this philosophical 
theory that are of particular relevance to the child-as-scientist debate. 
1.2.1 Theories : Formal systems or cognitive tools? 
The first point to be addressed concerns the empiricist account of a scientific 
theory as a formal logical system. Drawing on the foundations of mathematics as 
a model, logical empiricists developed a syntactic account of theories as 
structures comprising an axiomatic set of sentences in which theoretical 
postulates are connected in a lawful manner with the bedrock of statements 
about observable data via various correspondence rules. Construed in this way, 
as a collection of objective observation statements ordered by formal logic, 
theories were seen to hold the promise of delivering true descriptions of the 
world. The reluctance of a number of developmental researchers to credit 
children with theoretical knowledge can it is suggested be interpreted as 
stemming directly from an implicit commitment to this idealised empiricist 
conception. 
While the problems inherent in the syntactic account of theories are well 
documented in the literature (for a detailed treatment see Suppe, 1974), there 
are certain criticisms that seem especially pertinent to the issues considered in 
this study. Firstly, a number of critics have commented that this view of theories 
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bears little relation to how in fact theories are used by scientists in their day to 
day practice. Thagard (1988) argues that in order for an account of the nature of 
scientific theories to be practically adequate, it must be psychologically realistic; 
that is, it must accord with our understanding of how knowledge is structured in 
human minds. Likewise Giere (1988) indicates that the highly idealised 
description of scientific theories offered by the syntactic account, and indeed 
even the more sophisticated set-theoretic approach embraced by nee-empiricists 
(see van Fraassen, 1980), present only a stumbling block if our goal is to 
characterise the cognitive structures employed by real scientists. On reflection, it 
would seem that it is precisely this disparity between the standard account and 
the conceptual realities utilised by scientists that underlies Brewer and 
Samarapungavan's (1991) complaint that children's theories have been 
characterised as fragmented and imprecise because they have been 
inappropriately compared with the elegant formal reconstructions of theories 
within the institution of science. 
Another problem with this empiricist construal of the structure of scientific 
theories is that it fails to deal adequately with the dynamics of theory 
development. Thomas Kuhn (1970) was instrumental in bringing this criticism to 
bear on the syntactic account of theories outlined above, by demonstrating that 
the empiricist belief that science is a cumulative enterprise is not true to the 
reality of intertheory relations reflected in the history of science. His emphasis on 
the diachronic aspects of knowledge as a reaction to the traditional neglect of 
conceptual change, is echoed in Gopnik and Wellman's charge to the majority of 
child-as-scientist researchers, that through their neglect of the procedural 
aspects of scientific theories, they are endorsing an historically inadequate 
scientific standard for the assessment of children's knowledge. 
The empiricist conception of a scientific theory as a relatively fixed knowledge 
structure devoid of any 'epistemic life', is closely entwined with empiricism's 
official position on the role of theory in the scientific enterprise, that is as a 
convenient device for ordering observations. This instrumentalist view that takes 
theories to be merely organisational devices and denies them any referential 
role, has been criticised as woefully inadequate in portraying how theories 
actually function in science, most noticeably in its failure to appreciate the theory 
dependence of much of research practice (Hooker, 1975; Wylie, 1986). 
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1.2.2 Scientific Methods : distinct from everyday reasoning? 
The mismatch that exists between theories as we find them in science and the 
abstract formalised empiricist characterisation, is even more marked when we 
turn to a consideration of scientific methods. Here we are confronted with an 
empiricist picture of the ideally rational scientist, who operates by applying the 
· rules of formal logic to the objective facts. This traditional picture of knowledge 
production in science inspires little in the way of comparisons with children's 
thought. However, not only is this depiction of scientific inquiry far removed from 
the everyday problem solving activities of children, it would also seem at odds 
with what many philosophers regard as a realistic model of scientific rationality. 
Firstly, consider reasoning. According to an empiricist account of scientific 
method, reasoning is construed solely in terms of logical argumentation, 
encouraging the equation of rationality with logicality. Indeed it is an acceptance 
of this equation that would seem to underlie Deanna Kuhn's assessment of 
children as deficient reasoners (Kuhn, 1989). The distinction between children 
and scientists is thus revealed as a perceived difference in rationality. But is this 
in fact the case? Such claims concerning the lack of scientific reasoning in 
children, are predicated on the assumption that scientists typically reason in a 
logical manner. However such an assumption has been vigorously contested in 
philosophy of science literature by Toulmin (1972), who emphasised the 
importance of the distinction between logic and rationality, and more recently by 
Giere (1988) and Thagard (1988). 
Giere (1988) for example, argues that the view of scientific reasoning as properly 
restricted to formal logics, amounts to an a priori account of how scientists should 
think that fails to do philosophical justice to the reality of scientific investigation. 
His proposed solution is to forgo using the term 'rationality' altogether and simply 
talk about "human actions directed toward reaching specified goals" (1988, 
p.161 ). While this would seem an over-zealous reaction to the disparity between 
traditional philosophy of science and scientific practice, Giere's insight, namely 
that logic does not define the bounds of scientific reasoning, indicates that 
children are being inappropriately compared to a deficient conception of how 
scientists think. A more appropriate conception of 'right reasoning' would be one 
that does not deal exclusively with formal induction and deduction, but takes 
stock of other forms of reasoning important to scientific endeavour, such as 
abductive reasoning and reasoning by analogy. The resulting broadened 
account of rationality would in fact serve to highlight similarities between 
1 8 
children and scientists, not dissimilarities, as both these forms of reasoning are 
also important to everyday inquiry. 
Questions pertaining to the adequacy of the logical model of reasoning as a 
standard for children's thought, can be voiced with equal vigour against the 
received view of scientific method. Empiricism customarily employs the 
hypothetico-deductive account of scientific inquiry according to which theories, or 
more commonly singular knowledge claims, are tested in an indirect manner by 
deducing from them consequences which can then be subjected to direct 
empirical test. Under hypothetico-deductivism, the testing of hypotheses for 
evidential adequacy is where science proper begins ... and ends. All other 
aspects of inquiry are either neglected entirely, or seen to be located outside the 
realm of science. It is this account of scientific method which can be seen to 
underlie Deanna Kuhn's concern with the differentiation of theory and evidence 
in analysing intuitive scientific activity, and her conclusion that children (and lay 
people generally) are novice reasoners (Kuhn, 1989). 
In subscribing to hypothetico-deductivism however, Deanna Kuhn is endorsing a 
number of grounding assumptions of this theory of method which have been 
soundly criticized in the philosophy of science literature (see for example 
Glymour, 1980). For example, her claim that children and lay adults do not 
differentiate theory and evidence and hence are inferior reasoners, is based on 
the assumption that 'theory' and 'evidence' are in fact independent aspects of 
scientific endeavour. The recognition that scientists have no a priori knowledge -
that all data is to some extent infused with theory however, speaks against the 
autonomy of theory and evidence in scientific research (T.S. Kuhn, 1970; 
Hooker, 1987). 
In order to reason in a scientific manner, Deanna Kuhn requires that her subjects 
not only differentiate theory and evidence, but also co-ordinate the two in the 
appropriate manner. For Kuhn, this amounts to accepting theories as confirmed 
by supporting evidence, and rejecting theories as invalid in the face of 
contradictory data. These requirements would seem to rest squarely on the idea 
underwriting the hypothetico-deductive method (hereafter HD method) that 
testing theories for their predictive accuracy is a decisive test of a theory's worth. 
Such an assumption however has been overturned by the recognition embodied 
in what has become known as the Duhem-Quine thesis, that theories are 
notoriously underdetermined by empiricial evidence. 
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Related evidence against the claimed disparity between lay people and 
scientists, is to be found in analyses of how scientists do in fact view the 
relationship between theory and evidence. Despite Deanna Kuhn's claims to the 
contrary, scientists in general seem decidedly unwilling to relinquish their 
theories whose empirical predictions are not borne out by the data. Instead they 
will often tenaciously hold on to their theories in situations where, on a strict 
logical model of inquiry, one would expect the theories in question to be refuted 
(T.S. Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975). 
From the points listed above, hypothetico-deductivism seems at the very least 
rather precariously placed as an adequate theory of scientific method. Its 
adequacy is further jeopardised when one considers how little of the process of 
knowledge development in science HD method actually covers. For example, 
because on this account a theory is taken on board as a fixed and finished entity 
'ripe for the testing', there is a disconcerting lack of attention given to theory 
generation and development. As indicated earlier, HD method takes science to 
properly begin with the validation of theories via empirical test. The discovery 
process that precedes this point is dismissed as beyond rational characterisation 
(on a logical model of rationality), and therefore open only to a psychological 
interpretation (Giere, 1988). However by dismissing this context from sight as 
nonscientific, HD method fails to realise that there are patterns of reasoning 
governing theory creation that are indicative of a logic to discovery (Haig, 1987). 
HD method not only falls short by locating the 'beginning' of scientific inquiry 
within the context of justification, it also fails to provide an adequate treatment of 
this context, by demonstrating an exclusive concern with empirical adequacy. 
The underdetermination of a theory by empirical evidence however, means that 
any evaluation process based solely on this criterion is clearly incomplete. 
Recognition of this fact has led philosophers to search further afield for criteria by 
which to judge a theory's worth. Candidates recommending themselves for 
inclusion in a broadened account of the justification of scientific theories include 
consilience, simplicity, explanatory depth, fertility, and practical utility (T.S. Kuhn, 
1970; McMullin, 1983; Thagard, 1988). 
In sum, this section has attempted to highlight some of the inadequacies of the 
received view of science that underlies much of the child-as-scientist literature. 
In looking for an appropriate account of science to act as a standard for 
assessing children's thought, a fundamental requirement is that it demonstrate 
the capacity to capture the reality of scientific practice. From the criticisms 
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outlined above, empiricism would seem woefully inadequate in this regard. It is 
time then to consider an alternative. 
1.3 Evolutionary Naturalistic Realism : an 
alternative framework 
"Empiricists aim to base knowledge on facts and confine knowledge to the facts". 
Hooker, 1985 
"Science is concerned with creative cognitive construction in the face of 
evolutionary ignorance". 
Hooker, 1987 
As argued at the beginning of this chapter, in considering the utility of the child-
as-scientist analogy, a necessary preliminary is to ensure that the model of 
rationality projected from science to commonsense, is an adequate one. The 
indications that the empiricist standard currently underlying much of the child-as-
scientist literature does not meet this basic demand, requires that attention be 
directed towards an appropriate philosophical alternative. Such an alternative it 
is suggested, is to be found in the school of philosophical thought known as 
"Scientific Realism". 
Scientific realists broadly speaking, hold the view that there is a real world that 
exists independently of our cognitions about it, and that our most valuable 
theories are our best guides to the nature of that reality. Beyond these baseline 
assumptions however, a variety of realist stances present themselves for 
consideration. Far from being a uniform philosophical position, advocates of 
scientific realism express a plurality of views on such matters as the actual 
achievements of the scientific enterprise, the correct interpretation of intertheory 
relations, the referential status of theoretical terms, and the notion of truth and its 
role in cognitive activity. Of these multiple forms, a particular brand of realism 
defended by Hooker (1987) stands out as the most penetrating philosophical 
account of the nature of the scientific enterprise. It is to this theory of science 
entitled "Evolutionary Naturalistic Realism" (ENR), that attention is now turned. 
Hooker begins his defence of ENR by linking the adequacy of a theory of science 
to our evolutionary circumstances. For creatures born in ignorance he asks, 
21 
what is a rational strategy to adopt for advancing knowledge? The empiricist 
programme of limiting scientific inquiry to the observable realm has traditionally 
been deemed rational in light of its avoidance of epistemic risk. Indeed the 
trademarks of empiricist science, namely the focus on observables, the limitation 
of theories to harmless ordering instruments, and the confining of scientific 
reasoning to formal logics, can all be conceived as strategies of risk reduction, 
the presumed reward for implementing such a policy of caution being the 
promise of certain or near certain knowledge2 . 
Aiming to base knowledge on facts and deploying cautionary strategies to 
ensure that knowledge is confined to the facts however, is only a rational policy if 
the certainty of existence promised by the observable realm, is not an illusion. 
Revelations that observability is anything but a safe guide to existence, that there 
is no level of indubitability, no theory-neutral foundation for knowledge (Hooker, 
1985; Churchland, 1985), leaves the empiricist programme up in the air - its 
credibility as a risk-containing (and hence rational) enterprise hanging on an 
idiosyncratic distinction between what is and is not currently observable. 
By attempting to minimise epistemic risk in this way, the empiricist programme in 
fact runs the far greater risk of seriously retarding the advance of knowledge. 
Because much of the 'causal architecture' of the world is hidden from our gaze, it 
is plausible to assume that science requires strategies that enable inquirers to go 
below surface appearances in order to reach the deep seated causal 
mechanisms that purportedly underlie and give rise to phenomena (Hooker, 
1985). The cautionary measures undertaken by empiricism however, mean that 
the resulting focus on the observable realm will produce knowledge claims that 
at best will be seriously lacking in explanatory depth. Considering our 
evolutionary circumstances as "creatures exploring the world from an original 
position of ignorance" (Hooker, 1985, p.179), the adoption of such a programme 
for science would seem decidedly irrational. 
In contrast to empiricism's maxim to avoid epistemic risk at all costs, the realist 
alternative advocated by Hooker (1987) attempts to take stock of our situation in 
the world and design a realistic strategy for advancing knowledge that accords 
with a view of ourselves as products of biological and social evolution. Starting 
from a position of ignorance, Hooker argues that we have no choice but to accept 
risk as an unavoidable part of the knowledge development process. Because 
2 The minimization of risk can also be seen as the motivating force behind neo-empiricists' attitudes 
to theory acceptance. van Fraassen (1980) for example, advocates the view that the acceptance of 
a theory is properly a commitment only to empirical adequacy, not truth. 
22 
there is no independent access to the world, all our knowledge of what exists in 
the world must necessarily come to us via our theorising efforts. The knowledge 
claims that result from such efforts will inevitably be fallible since they are the 
products of human cognizers. Hence knowledge on ENR is best viewed as 
"warranted conjectural theory" (Hooker, 1987). 
In articulating his view of science, Hooker embraces a strong 'aim oriented' 
conception of rationality, according to which scientific inquiry is interpreted as 
properly concerned with the pursuit of valuable knowledge. According to 
Hooker, valuable knowledge is knowledge that will enable us to solve our most 
pressing problems of existence. Science on ENR (unlike traditional accounts of 
realism), is not construed in isolation from the human individual and from society. 
Rather it is seen to be a collective human endeavour, aimed at reducing the 
poverty of our ignorance, through the utilisation of our evolved cognitive 
resources for theorising within complex social structures (institutions) designed 
to promote collaborative inquiry. On Hooker's realist philosophy, science is very 
much a species strategy, the rationality of which derives from its service to 
humankind as a powerful system for ensuring our collective survival. 
On such a radical reinterpretation of science, the characterisations of theories 
and scientific methods can be seen to differ markedly from those given on an 
empiricist account. 
1.3.1 Realist theories 
ENR claims that all knowledge is theoretical knowledge, and hence it is our best 
extant theories that are our most reliable indicators of the nature of reality. In 
sharp contrast to empiricism's 'fact-file' characterisation of theories as convenient 
structures for organising objective observations, realist theories are construed 
primarily as explanatory tools, constructed by human cognizers in an effort to 
obtain a 'representational handle' on the world. In Hooker's terms, theories 
move from being merely dispensable empiricist "instruments of convenience" 
with no truth-value status, to their central realist role as "proponents of risk-taking 
endeavour" (Hooker, 1987). On a realist construal of science, theories represent 
our species' epistemological ticket out of ignorance. 
In order to function effectively in this role, theories will necessarily be deep-
structural or postulational in character, foregoing a concern with description of 
observables in an effort to construct a (plausible) causal story of the entities 
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thought to underlie and explain such phenomena. Not only do realist theories 
optimally function at some depth below the empirical surface, but their preferred 
scope will be wide. Whereas empiricism's concern has traditionally been with 
small-scale (often singular) knowledge claims seen to operate independently of 
the rest of science, Hooker (1975) places great import on the role of global 
theories in science, citing their integrative and unifying powers as a major 
scientific virtue in the pursuit of holistic understanding. 
Theories on ENR are further viewed as dynamically evolving entities which are 
inadequately captured by the static structural characterisations they are given on 
an empiricist account. From an evolutionary naturalistic realist perspective, 
scientists are seen to advance knowledge by generating a plurality of theoretical 
alternatives, which are then developed through a multi-criteria! process of critical 
comparative evaluation (Haig, 1995). 
1.3.2 Realist methods 
For creatures evolving from ignorance, method is of primary importance since as 
Hooker points out, " ... method is all that we have" (1987, p.41 ). Discarding the 
empiricist conception of knowledge as fact, for a fallibilist view of knowledge as 
warranted conjecture, necessitates that serious attention be directed towards our 
knowledge-making methods. In doing so, realists are led to reject the received 
view of scientific method as a logical algorithm for extracting truth. As Hooker 
makes clear, once we reflect on our evolutionary circumstances, we realise that 
not only do we possess no a priori knowledge, but we also are without a norm-
free methodology. Instead our methods are seen to evolve in interaction with our 
theories, with our accepted theories of the world determining which methods are 
most appropriate for us to adopt, and our best methods providing the 
justificational warrant for our theoretical conjectures (Hooker, 1987). 
Far from factoring the human component out of the knowledge production 
process (as witnessed in empiricism's attempts to restrict science to the facts and 
logic), ENR looks to capitalise on the natural reasoning capabilities we have 
evolved for making sense of phenomena. Accordingly, on a realist account of 
science the generation of knowledge is seen to occur through an abductive 
inferential process, whereby scientists make informed guesses about an 
independent reality by reasoning from the phenomena in question to reach an 
explanation of the causes underlying the phenomena (Haig, 1995). 
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In giving serious attention to the aim of relieving our ignorance, ENA looks to an 
account of scientific method that will promote the development of substantive 
theory. While the received view typically limits itself to a concern with scoring 
knowledge claims on empirical adequacy tests, and hence is ill-designed to 
achieve this end, an adequate realist account looks to provide scientists with a 
systematic approach to theory-building which is concerned with the full 
developmental history of a theory. Accordingly, such an account will be wholistic 
in character instead of focusing solely on theory testing, and will embrace the 
process of knowledge construction in its entirety, giving explicit attention to the 
multiple contexts of theory generation, theory development, and theory appraisal 
(Haig, 1987). 
The outline given above has provided only a brief characterisation of ENA (a 
more detailed presentation of a realist perspective on scientific method will be 
undertaken in Chapter 4 in line with its role as a standard for children's problem 
solving), however it would seem sufficient to recommend this realist account of 
science as an appropriate framework for investigating the child-as-scientist 
analogy on at least three counts: 
1) It is normatively adequate in that it embraces the recognition that we need to 
match our theory of how science should be practiced to our circumstances in the 
world. 
2) It gives serious attention to actual science and hence has the capacity to 
genuinely illuminate the reality of scientific practice. 
3) On this philosophical account, science is not viewed as a fundamentally 
different sort of endeavour to everyday intelligent reasoning (as empiricism 
would have it). Rather scientific discovery is conceived as a human activity - a 
refined outgrowth or extension of our commonsense attempts to make sense of 
the world. 
This study then can be seen to constitute an investigation of the child-as-scientist 
metaphor, with 'science' understood in realist terms. Armed with this framework 




The nature of folk psychology 
In the previous chapter it was proposed that any plausible argument for the child-
as-scientist model, necessarily begins in an assessment of the nature of theories 
and scientific reasoning. Accordingly, a realist account was endorsed as the 
most adequate characterisation of scientific thought, and hence the most 
appropriate framework for examining the relationship between science and 
commonsense. With a scientific framework in place therefore, this chapter turns 
its attention to everyday cognition, more specifically our commonsense 
understanding of human action or folk psychology. 
In looking to establish that theoretical knowledge is common to both scientists 
and children, folk psychology with its rich conceptual apparatus for 
comprehending human action, presents itself as a likely candidate for an 
everyday theory. As one of the first commonsense frameworks to emerge in 
humans, it has also attracted much attention from developmentalists wishing to 
argue that cognitive development be viewed in terms of theory construction. 
However, to perceive the child's acquisition of folk psychology as the 
development of a theory, necessitates that the underlying structure of our 
commonsense psychological understanding is in fact theoretical. Is it really 
plausible to suggest that folk psychology constitutes a genuine empirical theory? 
Researchers objecting to the 'theoretical view' (Morton, 1980; Wilkes, 1984), 
have claimed that folk psychology cannot be considered a theoretical structure 
because it does not consist of laws and does not support causal explanations, 
and its primary function is not that of an explanatory theory. In short , these critics 
suggest that folk psychology does not function in the way that theories do. 
Further criticisms focus on the distinctive nature of folk psychology. Researchers 
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such as Harris (1989), Gordon (1992), and Goldman (1993), argue that the 
manner in which we understand ourselves and our conspecifics is fundamentally 
different from understanding in other domains. In their view, our everyday 
psychological understandings arise from a process of "simulation" and are not 
the result of applying any theory, tacitly or otherwise. 
We have here, then, two bodies of criticism against the theoretical view. One 
compares folk psychology to a certain conception of scientific theories and finds 
it wanting; the other attaches a special status to our mentalistic construal of 
human action, and in doing so distinguishes it from theoretical knowledge. 
Tackling both forms of objection constitutes the work of this chapter. It will be 
argued that a consideration of these criticisms, together with an investigation of 
an alternative account of our understanding of human behaviour, lends credence 
to the view that folk psychology is theoretical in nature. 
2.1 Folk psychology as theoretical knowledge 
A primary objection to folk psychology's proposed theoretical status, concerns 
the generalisations that it employs. To take one example, Morton (1980) has 
indicated that this "stock of beliefs" cannot be seen to constitute a theory, 
because its generalisations do not have the character of genuine causal-
explanatory laws, and therefore do not function in the manner required. Instead 
Morton argues for a somewhat 'looser' characterisation of folk psychology, 
something he terms a "scheme". On this account our folk psychological 
explanations do not derive their authority from any fixed body of empirical 
principles or laws; there is no fixed content, only a set of underlying implicit 
constraints. However, as Churchland (1984) makes clear, a rich network of 
commonsense laws can be reconstructed from our everyday commerce, which 
(despite Morton's claims) do function in the appropriate manner. As with other 
theories, the laws of folk psychology depict the relations holding between the 
various entities postulated by the theory, these laws give meaning to the 
theoretical terms they contain, and they are more than normative principles or 
rules, in that they carry out causal-explanatory work (Churchland, 1991 ). 
Furthermore, rather than comprising a collection of disparate laws, Churchland 
persuasively argues that folk psychology is essentially a theoretical network or 
framework, that postulates a range of internal states whose causal relations are 
described by the theory's laws, and as such, does indeed support causal 
explanations. 
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It is likely that Morton's particular objections to the 'theory theory', stem from the 
particular characterisation of scientific theories utilised in his anti-theory claims. 
In Chapter One, it will be remembered, meaningful comparisons between folk 
psychology and theoretical structures in science were seen to operate at the 
level of framework theories. However, in looking to criticise the theoretical view, 
Morton seems concerned with more specific theoretical structures in science. 3 
Indeed in his proposed 'alternative' to the theory theory, Morton appears to be 
trying to account for the very features of folk psychology that are suggestive of its 
framework-theoretical status. That Morton's so called 'scheme' closely 
resembles a framework theory can be seen by the examples he gives to illustrate 
his proposal, namely composing within a musical tradition, giving a legal 
judgement in accordance with a body of precedents, and speaking a dialect of a 
language. The common theme amongst these examples is that they all evidence 
a similar structure. That is, they all seem to be getting at the idea of a framing 
body of knowledge within which there is improvisation and variation in the 
specifics, these variations however being ultimately constrained by the parent 
framework under which they are housed. Yet if this estimation of Morton's 
'scheme alternative' is correct, then stated as such it fails to present a convincing 
challenge to the theory argument endorsed in this thesis, since it does not 
differentiate itself sufficiently from the claim that similarities exist between 
commonsense psychology and framework theoretical structures in science. 
A further objection to the theoretical view highlights the variety of uses beyond 
explanation and prediction for which folk psychology is employed. Wilkes (1984) 
makes the point that folk psychology's resources are utilised for a score of social 
functions, which she proposes fall outside the realm of those functions rightly 
ascribed to theories. While Wilkes does not deny that the apparatus of folk 
psychology is used to explain and predict, she thinks the importance of such 
functions are greatly diminished when one considers the countless other tasks in 
which our folk psychological framework is routinely engaged, for example 
blaming, consoling, insinuating, congratulating, rebuking, to name but a few. 
Viewed in this light, folk psychology is very much a "multi-purpose tool" and as 
such says Wilkes, is to be sharply contrasted with scientific theories which are 
solely in the business of description and explanation. The implication is clear. 
Folk psychology would have to be stripped of all its 'extra-curricular' social roles 
in order to fit the mould of a scientific theory. As it stands, folk psychology is best 
conceived as a vehicle for social commerce, rather than an explanatory theory. 
3 That is, he seems concerned with theories that can be explicitly stated and hence subjected to 
the rigours of empirical testing. 
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There are two related points to be made here. Firstly, the fact that our 
commonsense psychology boasts a multitude of purposes, should not dissuade 
us from labelling it a theory. From a realist perspective on science which takes 
science to be a multi-purpose endeavour, there is no inconsistency in allowing 
that a scientific theory be multi-functional. To illustrate, Graham (1990) in a 
consideration of the genesis of our folk psychological framework, endorses both 
its theoreticity and its role in matters of social commerce. In essence, he views 
folk psychology as a "theoretical tool" that became part of our conceptual 
equipment because it enabled us to explain and predict behaviour, and hence 
provided its bearers with an adaptive advantage in social situations. Contra 
Wilkes, the social usefulness of our folk psychological framework in no way 
negates its theoretical status. Rather as exemplified by Graham (1990}, the two 
go hand in hand. 
The recognition that social usefulness and explanatory and predictive capacities 
are closely intertwined, prefigures the second point to be made here, namely that 
it is not at all obvious that the social functions Wilkes highlights should fall 
outside the list of those functions correctly ascribed to theories. Graham's work is 
instructive, because it makes clear that in discussing the social functions folk 
psychology performs, we are really discussing folk psychology's practical utility 
in its domain of operation. By divorcing folk psychology's role in social 
commerce from those roles rightly ascribed to theories, Wilkes is in fact divorcing 
theoreticity from practical usefulness. As such, her argument against the theory-
theory can be seen to rest on a decidedly narrow interpretation of the nature of 
theories and their function, since it essentially amounts to a rejection of folk 
psychology's theoretical status on the basis of its practical application in the 
world.· Paul Churchland makes the point thus: 
" ... theories are the conceptual vehicles with which we literally come to grips 
with the world. The fact that folk psychology serves a wealth of practical 
purposes is no evidence of its being non-theoretical. Quite the reverse." (1991, 
p. 43). 
Morton (1980) also points to the functions of theoretical structures in his bid to 
demonstrate that folk psychology is not a theory at all, but rather something less 
empirical, namely a "scheme". And like Wilkes, his argument can also be seen to 
rest on a narrow rendering of theory: 
29 
" ... theory is risky. It depends on a delicate balance of conjecture and fact, 
imagination and prudence ... Free imaginative hypotheses are allowable in 
science just because they take place within a network of tests, observations, and 
opportunities for critical reflection, that ensure public criticism of hypotheses and 
give refuting considerations a chance to appear" (1980, p. 29). 
Morton's underlying philosophy for such an argument, in a similar manner to 
other critics of the theory view discussed in Chapter One, would appear to 
incorporate a strong demarcation of science and non-science, where theorizing 
is properly seen to be a scientific process, and where folk psychology falls down 
because it lacks the necessary scientific balances and controls. In contrast, this 
work drawing on a realist philosophy of science endorses the view held by 
Karmiloff-Smith (1988) and Gopnik (1990) that both scientists and lay people are 
knowers, and that theory-building is a natural human tendency which both 
groups utilise in attempts to achieve order in their world. Given this view, to 
argue that folk psychology does not attain the status of 'theoryhood' because it 
does not embody scientific balances and controls or because it works for us in 
the world, would seem implausible. Rather, it is suggested that our 
commonsense psychological understanding is properly viewed as a 'proto-
science' - an early developing account of persons, whose status as an empirical 
theory is justified by its ability to explain and predict human action. As 
Churchland (1991) points out, in our everyday endeavours we standardly 
employ folk psychology to carry out causal-explanatory work. That is, we 
postulate that people act in accordance with their beliefs and desires in order to 
anticipate and gain some understanding of the actions of those around us. 
Indeed as Fodor (1987) has emphasised, the folk psychological assumption that 
our behaviour is 'thought-directed' - specifically that our actions are caused by 
our beliefs and desires in complex interactions with one another, serves us 
remarkably well in everyday contexts. 
Those rejecting folk psychology's proposed theoretical status do not deny that 
we use our body of folk psychological beliefs to explain and predict, and even 
acknowledge our large measure of success in these endeavours, but continue to 
maintain that folk psychology is not properly conceived as a theory. The 
suggestion made here is that these objectors miss the point that it is precisely 
these explanatory and predictive successes that indicate we are in possession of 
a theoretical structure. As Churchland points out, to be able to: 
a) recognise one's own actions as resulting from an interplay between one's 
beliefs, desires, and intentions regarding the world, and, 
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b) extrapolate from oneself to anticipate and manipulate the actions of other 
people, 
is already to be in possession of a conceptual understanding of mental 
phenomena, of their general connections both with each other and with 
behaviour (Churchland, 1991 ). Such a framework whether in a commonsense 
or scientific domain, is literally a theory. 
2.1.1 Folk psychology and the eliminativist challenge 
If it can be accepted from the proposals outlined above that folk psychology 
constitutes a theory, then we are immediately faced with yet another challenge to 
our commonsense framework, this time concerning its integrity. The argument, 
voiced most notably by Paul and Patricia Churchland takes the following form: 
Folk psychology is an empirical theory; as such we should evaluate it in the 
same manner that we evaluate theories in science. 
In the process of such an evaluation we discover that folk psychology stands up 
poorly to concerted theory appraisal - it is revealed as a false theory that grossly 
misrepresents the causes of human behaviour. 
Therefore it should be rejected and replaced by a superior alternative, namely 
a completed neuroscience. 
Hence the Churchlands' call is for outright elimination of folk psychology. 
If correct, the Churchlands' argument strikes a blow against the programme of 
this thesis, which seeks to develop the relationship between science and 
commonsense, since questions raised concerning the integrity of folk psychology 
will by implication impact on the validity of lay cognition more generally. Clearly, 
if young children are constructing and utilising a conceptual framework that 
approximates none of the regularities actually existing in the world, then the force 
of the claim that the child be seen as an intuitive scientist, is greatly diminished. 
There is a need, then, to defend folk psychology from calls that it be placed under 
the eliminativist's knife. An outline for such a defence can begin to be 
constructed _on two fronts. 
The first concerns the impact that an advancing neuroscience is forecast to have 
on the integrity of folk· psychology. In evaluating folk psychology, Paul 
Churchland (1981) argues that our folk theory demonstrates manifest failures, 
the most critical of these being its lack of coherence with our best theories in 
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adjoining fields, in particular that of neuroscience. Indeed, Churchland's 
eliminative claims can be seen to stem predominantly from his consideration of 
the notion of incommensurability as promoted by Kuhn (1970) and Feyerabend 
(1962), according to which the irreconcilibility of two theories in science results in 
the abandonment of the older theory for its superior successor. However, as a 
number of writers have noted (Horgan & Woodward, 1985; Greenwood, 1992), 
Churchland's allegations against folk psychology can be seen to rest on an 
implausibly strict reductive criterion, such that folk psychology must be reducible 
to a lower level theory in order to cohere with it. As Sterelny (1991) makes clear, 
in arguing his case for the theoretical isolation of folk psychology from the 
accepted body of scientific knowledge about the mind, Churchland fails to 
adequately distinguish between physical realisability and reducibility. 
Demonstrating the coherence of folk psychology with the view of ourselves as 
complex physical systems, requires only that our commonsense psychological 
theory demonstrate the former, not necessarily the latter (Sterelny, 1991 ). 
A related problem with Paul Churchland's 'incommensurability hence 
elimination' argument, is that it rests on an inadequate model of intertheoretic 
relations. A more satisfactory model (see McCauley, 1984) that distinguishes the 
relations that hold between successive theories at a certain level of analysis over 
time, from those that hold between theories at varying levels of analysis at the 
same time, reveals that the replacement of theories (as witnessed in the history 
of science) is an intra-level phenomenon. The mistake Churchland makes is 
that his eliminative conclusions regarding the inter-level theoretic relations 
holding between folk psychology and neuroscience are based on an analysis 
appropriate to intra-level contexts (such as the relation holding between folk 
psychology and cognitive psychology). Put simply, where folk psychology is 
concerned, neuroscience would have to be in the position currently occupied by 
cognitive psychology in order to 'catch a piece of the (eliminative) action'. 4 
A similar conclusion regarding the ·deficiencies in Paul Churchland's eliminative 
argument is reached if one focuses on the notion of theoretical pluralism. 
Clearly, Church land's motivation to critique folk psychology and to adopt 
neuroscience as a superior alternative is in line with his commitment to 
4 I would want to add to McCauley's model of intertheoretic relations a consideration of context. 
That is, the basis for both his and Churchland's comments is intertheoretic relations in the history of 
science. In the case of folk psychology and neuroscience however, we are concerned with 
theories that not only operate at different levels of description but also in differents contexts -
everyday and scientific. One would expect the resulting intertheoretic relations to differ from those 
existing between two theories utilised in science. Such an expectation seems to be borne out by 
Chi's (1992) findings concerning intuitive physics. Following formal education in physical science, 
the scientific theory does not appear to either reduce or replace the commonsense theory, rather 
the two tend to coexist. 
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theoretical pluralism, part of which involves the view that theory appraisal must 
be comparative. However, what is not clear from Churchland's endorsement of 
neuroscience at the expense of folk psychology, is that theoretical pluralism 
operates in two distinct senses, and in only one of these is comparative 
theoretical evaluation appropriate. 
Whereas in discussing theoretical pluralism within levels we are dealing with 
theories that are properly seen to be competing theoretical alternatives, when we 
turn to consider theoretical pluralism between levels it is not at all obvious that 
the different theories should be viewed as competing. Not only do they employ 
different concepts and principles which serve to highlight different aspects of the 
object of study (in this case the mind/brain), but as a result they also offer 
accounts that are more or less effective with different problems. Here it makes 
much less sense to carry out comparative analyses across levels and argue for 
the superiority of one theory over others. Yet in his calls to eliminate folk 
psychology and replace it with a superior neuroscientific alternative, it would 
seem this is exactly what Paul Churchland is proposing. 
The second front on which to challenge Churchland's argument, concerns his 
claims that folk psychology is a degenerating research programme. To propose 
that folk psychology demonstrates explanatory impotence and is essentially 
nonpr.ogressive, is to give our commonsense theory a bad review. Folk 
psychology works very well in everyday contexts precisely because it embodies 
a measure of explanatory and predictive power.5 Granted this power is not the 
result of any microreductive analysis (perhaps the Churchlands as ardent 
physicalists would not be so harsh in their judgements if it was), but then as 
indicated above, it is questionable whether a microreductive neurophysiological 
account would provide the theoretical illumination required in everyday contexts. 
Nor is it true to say that folk psychology has not progressed at all. One needs 
only to consider our current views of psychopathology and compare them with 
earlier notions of demonic possession to see that conceptual development has 
taken place. 
5 One plausible way in which to argue for this claim, is to view beliefs and desires as dispositions, 
which are invoked to provide dispositional explanations of the behaviour to which they give rise. 
On a realist view, dispositions can be seen to have genuine explanatory power. Specifically with 
regard to bf;)liefs and desires, this explanatory power involves two aspects: 
a) explanatory depth - beliefs and desires are successful at extending our referential reach 
b) explanatory breadth - they offer us some measure of consilience in our everyday attempts to 
understand human action, by 'binding together' their variable displays. (For a comprehensive 
treatment of the view that dispositions do explain, see Rozeboom, 198_4). 
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In sum, claims for the integrity of our folk psychological framework, and hence its 
retention in everyday contexts, are not the result of complacency, despite the 
Churchlands' attempts to paint supporters of folk psychology in this light. Rather 
folk psychology's staying power derives from its unsurpassed usefulness in our 
everyday attempts to explain, predict, and manipulate the actions of those 
around us. Contrary to the Churchlands' claims that folk psychology is ripe for 
elimination, our commonsense theory has not outlived its adaptive utility; the 
most likely reason being that it is at least partially successful in capturing some of 
the regularities existing in the world. The eliminative claims presented here at 
least provide no reason to reject such a conclusion. 
2.2 The nature of psychological knowledge 
A quite different challenge to the theory theory, is articulated in the form of an 
alternative account of our psychological knowledge. Rather than comparing folk 
psychology to a particular model of scientific theories and declaring it 
inconsistent, or challenging its integrity as a valid theoretical framework for 
understanding one another, this alternative conception questions whether we 
really need a theory to make sense of human action. According to philosophers 
such as Gordon _(1986) and Alvin Goldman (1989), our understanding of one 
another does not stem primarily from a system of nomically embedded concepts. 
Instead, we explain and predict each others' actions by drawing on the resources 
of our own minds to simulate the 'workings' of others. In short, in the case of our 
everyday psychological understanding we are simulators rather than theorists. 
At first glance, simulation theory presents itself as a far simpler explanation of 
how we typically arrive at judgements about the mental attitudes of others, since 
it deems an elaborate system of internally represented generalisations or rules, 
unnecessary. Gordon voices such a belief thus: 
"Insofar as the store of causal generalisations posited by (the theory theory) 
mirrors the set of rules our own thinking typically conforms to, the Simulation 
Theory renders it altogether otiose. For whatever rules our own thinking typically 
conforms to, our thinking continues to conform to them within the context of 
simulation ... In the light of this far simpler alternative, the hypothesis that people 
must be endowed with a special stock of laws corresponding to rules of logic and 
reasoning is unmotivated and unparsimonious" (Gordon unpublished, cited in 
Stich and Nichols, 1992, p.52). 
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On such an account, simulation seemingly avoids the need for a theory of mind, 
simply by taking advantage of the presumed structure of the mind itself. Hence 
according to Gordon, simulation theory is in direct competition with a theoretical 
account of our understanding of human action. 
Does simulation in fact render a theory of mind redundant? Any attempt to 
provide an accurate answer to this question necessarily involves a comparative 
evaluation of the two theoretical explanations along a number of dimensions. It 
would seem important to ask firstly, whether an understanding of mind is different 
in essential respects from understanding in other domains. For example, is the 
process underlying our understanding in the psychological domain quite 
different from the process by which we come to understand other phenomena? 
Secondly, and in connection with such questions, one would need to consider 
what provides the foundation tor our knowledge of human action. While our 
capacity for mental simulation may well be drawn upon in the process of 
acquiring such knowledge, it is far from clear whether simulation in the absence 
of a theory has the capacity to provide a sufficient base for such knowledge. 
2.2.1 Understanding others: just what sort of knowledge is 
involved? 
In the previous section, arguments were detailed in defence of the proposal that 
folk psychology is a theoretical structure, hence implying that our knowledge of 
human action is generated in the same way as our knowledge of the rest of the 
world, that is, by a process of theory construction. For some however, such a 
claim ignores arguably the most significant feature of the domain in question, 
namely the recognition that as persons we are endowed with similar cognitive 
structures and share a wide range of experiences with those we attempt to 
understand. As Harris (1989) points out, in making judgements about and 
attributing mental attitudes to other people, we are invoking mental states that we 
ourselves experience every waking day. Therefore, it appears reasonable to 
speculate that in attempting to understand our conspecifics, we have the 
opportunity to engage in some sort of 'projection' from our own case to that of 
others. Hence it would seem strange, say those in favour of simulation theory, 
that instead of putting this 'advantage' to good use, we opt for a fundamentally 
nonprojective basis for explanation and prediction, namely a theoretical 
framework. 
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A primary concern in assessing the plausibility of such a proposal is to determine 
just what exactly this 'advantage' alluded to above, entails. On this point, 
advocates of simulation theory differ. Harris' (1992) version of simulation, seems 
to suggest that the 'advantage' we possess in the domain of psychological 
knowledge is privileged access to our own mental states. Indeed he claims that 
"privileged access is an important feature of our mental lives" (p.141 ), and one 
that has the potential to embarrass those adherents to the theory theory who 
have ignored the role of such access in our understanding of human action. 
However, despite the fact that his account of simulation rests on an appeal to 
privileged access, Harris fails to undertake any consideration of how we come to 
have immediate and privileged knowledge of our sensations, emotions, beliefs, 
and desires. For example, it would seem important to ask why from an 
evolutionary perspective, the mind should be transparent to itself? As Paul 
Churchland (1984) points out, the view that the mind knows itself first, in a unique 
way, and much better than it can ever know the external world, does not cohere 
with the recognition that what individuals know first and best must surely be the 
environment in which they have to survive. Moreover, Harris' anti-theory account 
rests on the supposition that 'self perception' has developed in such a way that it 
is fundamentally different from our perception of the external world, yet the 
grounds for maintaining such a proposal, remain unclear. · 
In light of such questions, the proposal that the 'advantage' we possess in the 
psychological domain takes the form of some mysterious Cartesian self-
awareness, would seem in the very least, rather implausible. The implausibility 
of such an account however, is perhaps most telling if one considers the course 
of development in childhood. Gopnik & Wellman (1992) present empirical data 
on children's errors and inaccuracies in attributing mental states to themselves 
and others, which are inconsistent with the position that children have privileged 
access to their own mental states. Specifically, these researchers found that 
such errors and accuracies did not differ between self and other in any clear 
fashion, but rather divided between certain theoretical constructs differing in 
complexity, such as beliefs and desires. 
Gordon (1986, 1992), in contrast to Harris, rejects any appeal to Cartesian 
doctrine _in his version of simulation theory. He maintains that the psychological 
process by which we acquire knowledge of human action is very different from 
the process by which we acquire knowledge in other domains, but claims this is 
not the result of any privileged access. Rather, he argues that the fact that we are 
endowed with the same cognitive systems as those we attempt to understand, 
means that such understanding can be achieved by a process of simulation; that 
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is, by "using our imagination to identify with others in order to explain or predict 
their behaviour" (Gordon, 1992, p.87)6 . Such an account seems to rest on the 
following perception of how our cognitive system normally functions: 
/ Perceptual '\.. 













"Pretend"· Belief and 
Desire Generator 
Diagram of functioning cognitive system (from Stich & Nichols, 1992 p.40) 
To take our capacity for p~ediction of others as an example, Gordon (1986) 
provides this account of the simulation process: 
6 This argument does depend heavily on Gordon's assumption that our cognitive systems are in 
fact the same and not merely similar. If they were only similar then intuitively the simulation account 
given above would seem insufficient to account for our ability to understand the behaviour of 
others. 
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" ... our decision-making or practical reasoning system gets partially disengaged 
from its 'natural' inputs and fed instead with suppositions and images (or their 
'subpersonal' or 'subdoxastic' counterparts). Given these artificial pretend inputs 
the system then 'makes up its mind' what to do. Since the system is being run 
off-line, as it were, disengaged also from its natural output systems [ie: action 
control systems], its 'decision' isn't actually executed but rather ends up as an 
anticipation ... of the other's behaviour" (1986, p.170). 
According to such an account, mental simulation involves the capacity for 
practical reasoning together with the ability to incorporate 'pretend' facts and 
values into the system in order to make adjustments for relevant differences 
between self and other. In order to predict someone's actions, then, rather than 
deploy a theory, we simply use part of our own cognitive mechanism to simulate 
the workings of part of theirs. A similar idea appears to be involved in Goldman's 
(1989) proposal that simulation can be "process-driven": 
"This can happen if (1) the process that drives the simulation is the same as (or 
relevantly similar to) the process that drives the system, and (2) the initial states 
of the simulating agent are the same as, or relevantly similar to, those of the 
target system. Thus, if one person simulates a sequence of mental states of 
another, they will wind up in the same (or isomorphic) final states as long as (a) 
they began in the same (or isomorphic) initial states, and (b) both sequences 
were driven by the same cognitive process or routine. It is not necessary that the 
simulating agent have a theory of what the routine is, or how it works" (p.173). 
A further point made by Gordon in defence of simulation theory, is that the 
capacity for simulation may be largely innate. Pointing to the human tendency to 
mimic other people's bodily postures, especially facial expressions, and to the 
tendency found in many mammals of turning their eyes toward the target of 
another's gaze, Gordon argues that the "readiness for practical simulation is a 
prepackaged 'module' called upon automatically in the perception of other 
human beings" (1986, p.170). 
In contrast to invoking some mysterious Cartesian self awareness, Gordon's 
account of how simulation might operate is far more appealing. Intuitively, the 
existence of such a module makes good sense. Any mechanism that gave one 
the ability to interpret and anticipate another's actions, would certainly provide a 
decided advantage to the bearer. The plausibility of an innate capacity for 
simulation however, provides no reason for rejecting a theoretical account of our 
psychological understanding, despite appeals to the contrary. While it is true that 
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the theory theory traditionally articulated makes no allowance for mental 
simulation 7, there is no reason why it should deny that simulation is involved in 
the process of understanding. As Paul Church land (1991) points out, it is 
reasonable to assume that a great portion of our appreciation of human action 
does derive from our ability to examine and extrapolate from our own case. But 
this is hardly inconsistent with a theoretical account of our understanding of 
human behaviour, nor does it render such an account redundant, since - "[one) 
learns from every example of humanity one encounters, and one encounters 
oneself on a systematic basis" (Paul Churchland, 1991, p.45). 
Indeed, the main achievement of those advocating simulation theory would seem 
to be the clarification they have given to the concept of mental simulation and to 
how it might operate in our ascription of mental attitudes to others. What 
proponents of simulation theory have not achieved, I maintain, are grounds to 
reject the basic tenets of the theoretical view. For such a rejection to be 
warranted, it would be necessary to demonstrate not merely that mental 
simwlation has a part to play, but that simulation (devoid of any underlying 
theory) is the foundation for our psychological knowledge. And it would seem 
that such a position has yet to be convincingly put forward by any defender of 
simulation theory. 
2.2.2 Simulation: the foundation of interpretation? 
A primary objection to the view that simulation is the originating source of 
psychological interpretation, is that simulation is not necessary for 
understanding the behaviour of others. To take an example, Johnson (1988) in 
the following passage echoes a view held by many advocates of simulation 
theory: 
"Simulation avoids the need of a theory of mind ... It allows children to make 
efficient and adaptive use of their own conscious experience to understand the 
experience of others" (p.58). 
But if this was the case then our experience would necessarily define the limits of 
our understanding of human action (Paul Churchland, 1991 ). Landau & 
Gleitman (1985) provide data which contradict Johnson's claim, clearly 
indicating that our psychological knowledge is not so limited. In their 
7 For some researchers, it is this 'deletion' that would seem to be the primary motivation for 
advocating the plausibility of mental simulation (see Goldman 1989, 1992). 
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experimental and observational work, these researchers detail how congenitally 
blind children are able to learn about words such as "look" and "see" whose 
meanings would appear to depend fundamentally upon sight. Far from being 
"empty verbalisms", blind children aged 3-4 years were found to attribute such 
"sighted vocabulary" to others and not to themselves. Furthermore, Kelli a young 
blind child involved in the research, clearly displayed knowledge of the 
distinction between the terms "look" and "see" as they apply to sighted people -
she knew that there were occasions on which her mother "looked" but did not 
"see". How such knowledge is acquired, would seem to be an anomaly on a 
simulation account. Clearly it is not acquired via simulation of first person 
experience. But if first person experience is not necessary for understanding the 
behaviour of others, then it can hardly be heralded as the foundation for such 
knowledge. 
Another problem with the simulation theory, standardly conceived, is alluded to 
by Dennett (1987) who questions how it can work without being a kind of 
theorizing: 
"If I make believe I am a suspension bridge and wonder what I will do when the 
wind blows, what comes to mind depends on how sophisticated my knowledge 
is of the physics and engineering of suspension bridges. Why should making 
believe that I have your beliefs be any different? In both cases, knowledge of the 
imitated object is needed to drive the make-believe 'simulation', and the 
knowledge must be organized into something rather like a theory" (p.100). 
There are a number of points to be made here. Firstly, it would seem that in 
projecting mental states onto another person, one generally has to make 
'imaginative adjustments' in one's states to account for differences in situation. 
And making such adjustments, rests on the ability to discriminate one's mental 
states. But surely this requires that one is already in possession of the relevant 
concepts, which in short would presuppose a theory. Gordon (1992) objects to 
the conclusion that one could not simulate a type of mental state unless one 
already had the concept of that state. Instead, he claims that mental concepts 
can arise out of the process of simulating others. This alternative proposal rests 
on his belief that the majority of simulation work is in fact carried out by relatively 
superficial imitative mechanisms (such as the automatic muscular mimicry of 
others' facial expressions), that operate in the absence of such concepts. While 
this may provide a part answer to how we recognise mental states such as 
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emotions in others8 , it is not clear how such an argument could account for other 
mental states such as beliefs, which in large part are unobservable. The 
problem appears to remain; simulation theory is merely an account of a 
procedure used in ascribing mental states to others. And such a procedure must 
in general ·assume a prior theoretical understanding of mental states. 
A second point to be made is that mental simulation is typically articulated by its 
advocates as a form of modelling, where we use ourselves as a model of the 
other in order to explain and predict the others' actions. Researchers such as 
Goldman (1989), Harris (1989), and Ripstein (1987), highlight the ways in which 
models are used in other domains such as engineering to determine whether 
various events would produce certain effects on their real counterparts. Such 
employment of models they claim, supports their argument that using oneself as 
a model is a legitimate method by which to achieve understanding of others. 
However, a model of a bridge to take one example, can only be used to 
demonstrate the connections between an event (a hurricane), and an effect (the 
collapse of a suspension bridge), if the model is similar to the bridge in question 
in all relevant respects. Otherwise the demonstration is empty. And determining 
which similarities are relevant requires theoretical knowledge. Hence, if using 
oneself as a model or analog of another operates in the same manner as 
engineering models, then as Gordon (1992) points out, it too must stand on the 
premise of similarity in theoretically relevant respects. Therefore, it could be 
argued (see Dennett, 1987) that simulation is not really in direct competition with 
the theory theory, since simulation requires theoretical knowledge in order to be 
justified, and hence presupposes a theory. 
Gordon (19_92) thinks such a claim is only relevant to what he terms the "model 
model of simulation", ·which in contrast to Goldman (1989) and Harris (1989), he 
explicitly rejects. In Gordon's judgement, we simply utilise part of our own 
cognitive system off-line to 'generate' a decision. And since we are not making 
any implicit inference from ourselves to another, there is no need to postulate a 
theory to justify such an inference. Gordon however provides few details as to 
how in fact our practical reasoning system generates such decisions. We are 
told that the system "makes up its mind" what to do. But what does 'making up its 
mind' involve? It is plausible to entertain Fodor's suggestion (cited in Stich & 
Nichols, 1992), that our practical reasoning system generates a decision from 
beliefs and desires by exploiting an internally represented theory. At the very 
8 Here Gordon is alluding to the fact that emotional contagion displayed by infants clearly precedes 
any capacity to attribute emotion to others (see Gordon 1992, p.25). 
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least, such a suggestion would seem to support the view that simulation is 
dependant on the existence of an underlying theoretical structure. 
A final reason why mental simulation would seem to presuppose a theory, is 
drawn from Paul Churchland's assessment of the plausibility of this alternative 
account. He concludes that even if simulation can be shown to allow for the 
prediction of others' behaviour, it is incapable of providing any explanatory 
understanding in the abse~ce of an underlying theory. To emphasize his point, 
Churchland provides the following illustration: 
"Suppose I were to possess a marvellous miniature of the physical universe, a 
miniature I could manipulate in order to simulate real situations and thus predict 
and retrodict the behaviour of the real universe. Even if my miniature unfailingly 
provided accurate simulations of the outcomes of real physical processes, I 
would still be no further ahead on the business of explaining the behaviour of 
the real world. In fact, I would then have two universes, both in need of 
explanation" (1991, p.46). 
According to this view, in -order to use oneself as a model of another, one must be 
able to explain one's own behaviour, and simulation provides no such 
explanatory understanding. Such understanding according to Churchland, 
demands "a nomic framework that allows one to appreciate the general patterns 
that comprehend the individual events" (Churchland, 1991 ). 
Advocates of simulation theory have responded to such a claim by pointing out 
that a model can be used to simulate counterfactual conditions in order to test 
their influences and hence enable one to pick out the relevant causal factors in a 
given situation. Goldman (1989) appears to hold that such an ability to eliminate 
various alternative hypotheses is sufficient to provide us with an explanation of 
the event in question. Gordon (1992) is rather more cautious in his reply to 
Churchland's objection. He concedes that in discussing physical phenomena 
ge~erally, a simulation alone is insufficient to provide an adequate explanation, if 
as Churchland implies, explanation involves not only a discrimination of the 
causal factors at work, but also an understanding of why the cause had the effect 
it did. Such a concession however, does not move Gordon to reject his claim 
that si~ulation avoids the· need for positing a theoretical framework. Instead he 
proposes that explanatory un~erstanding of human action is of a different kind to 
explanation in other domains, and therefore avoids Churchland's objection. In 
short, Gordon b~lieves that the explanatory understanding we look for when 
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attempting to u_nderstand why a person acted as she did, is in fact empathic 
understanding: 
"The empathic method gives us all the explanatory ur:,derstanding we want; it 
(not a law) ·enables us to see the connection between explanans and 
explanandum" (1992, p.29). 
Such a proposal brings us almost full circle, since it stands as a statement of 
continued motivation to view our understanding of human action as distinct from 
understanding in other domains and hence not dependent upon theoretical 
knowledge. In contrast, the arguments outlined in this section in favour of the 
theoretical view have been based on a perception of our psychological 
knowledge as fundamentally the same as our knowledge of the rest of the world. 
Just as we learn about the outside world, we also come to understand the 
activities of our inner states by a process of conceptual development, 
characteristic of our attempts to make sense of phenomena generally. In short, 
an understanding of how we function is achieved by a process of theory 
construction. And if it can be accepted that any appeal to empathy demands an 




The child and folk psychology 
"Let us imagine a being, knowing nothing of the distinction between mind and body. Such a being 
would be aware of his desires and feelings but his notions of self would undoubtedly be much less 
clear than ours. Compared with us he would experience much less the sensation of the thinking 
self within him, the feeling of a being independent of the external world. The knowledge that we 
are thinking of things severs us in fact from the actual things. But, above all, the psychological 
perceptions of such a being would be entirely different from our own. Dreams, for example, would 
appear to him as a disturbance breaking in from without. Words would be bound up with things and 
to speak would mean to act directly on these things. Inversely, external things would be less 
material and would be endowed with intentions and will. We shall try to prove that such is the case 
with the child. The child knows nothing of the nature of thought, even at the stage when he is 
being influenced by adult talk concerning "mind", "brain", "intelligence" (Piaget, 1960 p.37). 
If it can be accepted from the proposals outlined in Chapter 2 that folk 
psychology is theoretical in nature, then one needs to ask whether it is 
appropriate to credit young children with a folk theory of mind. Traditionally, 
young children's thought has been depicted as the very antithesis of rational 
thinking, that is, as preconceptual, acausal and adualistic (Johnson, 1988). 
Essentially, children have been viewed as fundamentally different types of 
thinkers than adults, with cognition seen to undergo qualitatively different forms 
as the child proceeds through a well defined sequence of developmental stages. 
The child-as-scientist metaphor distinguishes itself from traditional depictions of 
childhood thought, by striking an antithetical pose to any such demarcation 
between children and adults. By implying that children should be credited with 
the kinds of theoretical knowledge and forms of inquiry found in institutionalised 
science, the analogy effectively traverses the dividing line traditionally erected 
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between child and adult thought. On this view children are not impoverished 
thinkers, rather in their everyday attempts to comprehend the world they bear a 
striking resemblance to adult scientists. 
The aim of this chapter is to indicate the plausibility of the child-as-scientist 
metaphor by focusing on the young child's development of ideas about the mind 
and its relation to the world. The characterisation of childhood thought that 
emerges from such deliberations, challenges the traditional depiction of the child 
as an inferior thinker and provides some provocative empirical evidence in 
support of child-scientist comparisons. Specifically, tracing the child's 
development of an understanding of mind indicates that the child can be seen as 
an intuitive scientist in two important ways; firstly with regards to the content of 
their knowledge, and secondly in terms of the process by which they go about 
exploring the world. 
3.1 Adherence to a theory of mind 
In looking to prove claims regarding children's understanding of folk psychology, 
a primary concern is whether or not their knowledge rests on the specific 
ontological commitments of this mentalistic framework. In our everyday attempts 
to make sense of phenomena we are commonsense realists; that is, we ascribe 
to the view that a world exists independently of our thoughts of it, and hence 
draw a fundamental distinction between internal mental phenomena and 
external physical and behavioural phenomena. If young children are to be 
reasonably credited with anything like an adult theory of mind, they would need 
to demonstrate an appreciation of this demarcation between the internal mental 
realm and the external physical realm. 
Traditionally, the proposal has been that young children fail to honour any such 
distinction. Rather they have been characterised as adualistic, treating the 
mental and physical realms as a single, undifferentiated whole up until 6-7 years 
of age. According to Piaget, two principle confusions define children's thinking in 
this early period. The first, is to perceive thought as material and to identify it with 
external behaviour such as talking; and the second is to equate thoughts with 
their corresponding physical referents, prompting the claim that " ... the child 
cannot distinguish a real house for example, from the concept or mental image or 
name of the house" (Piaget, 1960 p.55)9 . Recently however, this depiction of 
9 The term 'childhood realism' coined by Piaget, has come to identify this general view of young 
children's thought. The reference to realism is an attempt to highlight the fundamental deficiency 
in children's thinking, that is, the failure to grasp the mental-real distinction and hence the 
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children's understanding qt mental phenomena has been challenged by a body 
of research which indicates that even very young children are knowledgeable of 
' the basic categories of existence. 
Wellman and Estes (1986) found that 3 year olds demonstrate an understanding 
of the behavioural-sensory differences between mental and physical 
phenomena, and can use such 'reality criteria' to distinguish between real 
entities (a dog) and mental entities (a thought about a dog). Young children 
correctly judge that real objects can be seen, touched, and acted upon, that other 
people can perceive such. objects, and that such objects have a consistent 
existence over time. Conversely, young children appreciate that mental entities 
cannot be seen, touched, or acted upon, and cannot be experienced publicly or 
consistently (Wellman & Estes, 1986). In addition, young children's knowledge 
of the mental realm was found to extend beyond such judgements to include 
some recognition of the 'positive' features of mental phenomena, for example 
their capacity to be transformed or manipulated by thought alone (Wellman & 
Estes, 1986). 
Furthermore, contrary to Piaget's claims, it appears that young children are not 
prone to more subtle misconceptions regarding the distinction between mental 
and physical entities. Three year olds were found to be capable of differentiating 
between mental entities and real, but absent, physical objects (Wellman & Estes, 
1986). They appropriately distinguished mental entities from "close impostors" 
such as shadows, air, and smoke, which are real but intangible entities (Estes et 
al, 1989). Relatedly, they had no trouble differentiating between the mental 
image of a particular object and a 'close impostor' of another kind, namely an 
inaccessible physical representation of the object (a photograph hidden in a 
box), suggesting that they apprehend the distinction between mental and 
physical representations. Moreover, in all of the above examples, children gave 
very different sorts of explanations for physical items (location-possession 
explanations), in comparison to mental items for which they gave mental 
explanations (Estes et al, 1989). Collectively such findings indicate that young 
children's ,understanding of mental phenomena is not hopelessly confused. 
Rather, by drawing informative contrasts between children's conceptions of 
mental and physical phenomena, this research presents compelling evidence 
that even 3 year olds are capable of making the appropriate ontological 
distinction central to folk psychology. 
attribution of real properties to mental entities. Use of this term has been avoided here so as to 
prevent confusion with the alternative proposal being put forward, namely that children are 
commonsense realists -· a claim which rests on their capacity to make the distinction between 
thought and a real world which e).(ists independently of such thought. 
46 
In order to substantiate the claim that young children possess a theory of mind, it 
is also necessary to address children's causal understanding of human action. 
Folk psychology views the generation and interpretation of human action in 
mentalistic terms, that is, actions are seen to result from the interplay between an 
actor's beliefs, desires, and intentions. Evidence that pre-school children 
understand mental entities to be ontologically distinct from physical entities, 
suggests that they may very well possess a basic conception of the entities 
encompassed by folk psychology. However to qualify as a theory of mind, young 
children .need.to exhibit an appreciation of psychological causality. 
In order to evaluate children's ability to invoke the internal mental states of an 
actor as a way of understanding human action, it is necessary to first consider the 
cognitive competences or abilities that underlie our commonsense view of the 
world, most notably our capacity for meta-representation. Indeed, as a number of 
researchers have noted (Forguson & Gopnik, 1988; Gopnik, 1990; Perner, 1988), 
the ability to meta-represent, that is to reflect on one's own representational 
system, is an essential development that enables the child to move from merely 
having mental representations, to reasoning causally about such representations 
in terms of their role in determining behaviour. When do such abilities emerge in 
children? Evidence from a wide variety of sources suggests that by 18 months 
children have developed the capacity to reflect to some extent on their own 
intellectual processes. Unlike young infants whose representations seem to be 
tied directly to their experience of the world, the child at 18 months has 
developed the ability to consider alternatives to reality and to contrast such 
alternatives with the existing state of affairs. The suggestion made by Forguson 
and Gopnik (1988), is that this ability for constructing counterfactual 
representations is closely linked to the child's emerging capacity for meta-
representation. Such a proposal provides a coherent explanation for a wide 
variety of achievements witnessed in this period. For example, evidence of the 
invention of intelligent solutions to difficult problems by 18 month olds indicates 
meta-representational abilities at work. According to Gopnik (1982), when young 
children invent new solutions to problems they seem to carry out experiments in 
their heads, that is mentally run through hypothetical courses of action and their 
associated outcomes without actually having to experience either the actions or 
their outcomes. 
Similarly, the emergence of pretend play in 18 month olds (Leslie, 1988), the 
growing recognition that people may see the world differently from themselves, 
as witnessed in visual perspective taking tasks (Flavell et al, 1981 ), and 
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indications that young children use early words to refer to aspects of their plans 
and encode abstract relations between their aims, actions, and the world 
(Gopnik, 1982), can all be accounted for by attributing meta-representational 
abilities to the young child. A further body of supporting evidence that young 
children demonstrate the capacity for meta-representation, is drawn from the 
work of Wellman and Estes (1986} referred to earlier. Their findings that 3 year 
olds distinguish between dreams, images, and thoughts, and real objects, and 
provide extended explanations to justify their distinctions provides yet another 
indicator that young children have the ability to form second-order 
representations, and contrast representations with reality. 
If young children do possess some meta-representational abilities, then it seems 
plausible to consider whether they share much of our basic folk psychological 
causal-explanatory framework for human action. For example, if children are told 
of an actor's beliefs and desires they should be able to predict her behaviour. 
Conversely, if children are asked to explain an action, they should do so by 
appealing to beliefs and desires. Evidence from investigations of belief-desire 
reasoning in young children (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Wellman & Bartsch, 
1988), suggests that by 3 years of age children do appeal to a mentalistic 
psychological framework for the explanation and prediction of behaviour. Three 
year olds demonstrate an understanding of beliefs and desires as distinct mental 
states, as well as recognising the links between these two constructs, namely 
that they are jointly responsible for determining a person's actions (Wellman & 
Bartsch, 1988). Given one half of the causal equation (an actor's beliefs and 
desires), children as young as three can predict the appropriate behavioural 
outcome (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). These children also demonstrate the 
flexibility to work backwards; if told of a character's action, "Jane is looking for her 
kitten under the piano" and then asked "Why do you think she is doing that", 
young children reply by framing their answers in terms of what the protagonist 
wants and thinks (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989). 
This, however, is not to say that the early belief-desire reasoning scheme utilised 
by 3 year olds rests on an understanding of psychological causality that is the 
same as that possessed by older children or by adults. A point of much debate 
in the literature is whether or not children of this age understand the mind as a 
representational system. The com~only held view is that 3 year olds possess a 
mentalistic but non-representational model of the mind, and .that representational 
understanding only emerges about a year later. Forguson and Gopnik (1988), 
for example, suggest that the crucial difference between 3 year olds and older 
children is that 3 year olds fail to perceive the relation between the mind and 
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external reality as one which is mediated by mental representations. According 
to these authors, 3 year olds are only capable of contrasting the real world with 
the 'non-real' mental world; they do not understand that reality is itself 
represented. However, it is proposed that the findings of Wellman and Bartsch 
(1988) that 3 year olds were 82-90% correct in predicting a character's action on 
the basis of his belief that was discrepant from their own and from reality, and in 
predicting a character's action on the basis of his belief which changed over 
time, suggest a more gradual progression of representational awareness. 
Specifically, these results indicate that 3 year olds recognise that belief is subject 
to diversity and change, which could be seen as the beginning of an 
understanding that beliefs and desires are not objective features of the world, but 
rather are a function of representations.1 ° 
A final point on which to compare children's understanding of the mind with our 
adult folk psychology, relates to questions of coherence. Like its framework-
theoretical counterparts in science, folk psychology provides us with an 
interconnected network of beliefs, which enables us to comprehend an important 
aspect of our everyday world - the actions of those around us. The coherent 
nature of our commonsense mentalism becomes readily apparent when we 
consider the ir:,terrelationships between the various constructs entailed by our 
folk psychology. In brief (see Wellman, 1990 for details), our physiological states 
and wha:t Wellman terms "basic emotions" are generally taken to be the catalysts 
for our desires, while our beliefs are seen to stem from our perceptions of the 
world. According to our everyday theory, the interplay of these beliefs and 
desires cause us to act, and the outcomes of our actions can result in a range of 
emotional reactions, for example happiness, sadness and surprise. A schematic 
presentation is given in Figure 2 below. An inspection of the interrelated nature 
of our adult folk psychology leads one to question whether the young child's 
understanding of the mind also displays this coherence. 
10 Not everyone agrees with the account just sketched. For example Perner (1988, 1991) 
vigorously rejects the proposal that 18 month olds evidence some meta-representatonal abilities, 
seeing their achievements to result instead merely from an ability to construct and use multiple 
models. In his view, the capacity for meta-representation only emerges at around 4 years when 
children demonstrate an explicit understanding of mental representation. Stated as such, I see two 
problems with his account. Firstly, by attributing an 'all or none' quality to meta-representation as a 
capacity which is present at 4 years and not before, Perner fails to adequately account for 3 year 
olds intermediate level of understanding of representation as demonstrated by Wellman and 
Bartsch (1988). Secondly, it would appear that Perner's motivation for locating the onset of meta-
representation at 4 years stems in large part from the desire to tie meta-representation as a form of 
meta-cognition to explicit awareness. However the necessity of conscious reflection for meta-
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Figure 2 Belief-desire psychology: a schema of the organisation of the 
constructs of our everyday theory of mind (from Wellman, 1990). 
By 3-4 years, it appears that children's folk psychological understanding does 
comprise an interconnected network of constructs, and one that extends beyond 
the basic belief-desire-action triad discussed earlier. According to Wimmer et al 
(1988), young children not only manifest the ability to draw on beliefs and 
desires to predict people's actions, they also acknowledge the role of perception 
in this causal sequence, recognising its importance in the initial formation of 
people's beliefs about the world. 
·Emotion figures prominently in our everyday psychology, and therefore it is not 
surprising to find that by 3 years of age children have also developed a coherent 
understanding of the relationship between the mind and emotion. The work of 
Harris et al (1989) demonstrates that children recognise it is not the objective 
features of the situation itself, but rather a person's appraisal of that situation that 
governs their emotional reactions to it. Their findings suggest that children's 
understanding of the causes of emotion extend far beyond a facile 'situationist' 
interpretation of links be~ween various situations and associated emotions. 
Rather, in their appeals to characters' beliefs and desires to explain and predict 
emotional reactions, children evidence an understanding of the causal 
organisation of emotion that is fundamentally the same as adults. 
In sum, such evidence implies that children's understanding of the mind is 
appropriately interrelated and interconnected. Furthermore, when asked to 
explain mental entities children often reply by framing their explanation in terms 
of other mental entities, suggesting that their understanding is also "mutually self-
defining" (Wellman, 1988). For example, Wellman & Estes (1986) found that 
children as young as three tended to identify m~ntal terms by appealing to their 
50 
similarity to other mental terms. Overall, these examples can be seen to lend 
credence to the view that children's folk psychology is coherent, since they 
demonstrate how the various constructs within our everyday psychology make 
reference to one another, and how children evidence knowledge of this 
theoretical framework from a young age. 
From the evidence cited, it would seem that even young children are engaged in 
much the same folk psychological enterprise as adults. Their understanding 
rests on the requisite ontological distinctions, it displays coherence, and provides 
a powerful causal-explanatory framework with which to comprehend human 
action. For many developmentalists the analogy between children's knowledge 
and theories in science ends here. Yet there is another sense in which 
children's knowledge may be profitably viewed as theory-like, namely in terms of 
the processes by which it undergoes development. If we turn to the more 
dynamic characteristics of theories mentioned in Chapter One that are involved 
in the process of theory change in science, we can ask whether the theory 
analogy is sustained. That is, we can investigate whether these features are also 
apparent in children's developing understanding of mind. 
3.2 Conceptual change as theory change 
A recent collation of empirical evidence bearing directly on this question, is 
presented by Gopnik & Wellman (1992), who conclude that the gradual transition 
from one view of the mind to another between the ages of 2.5 and 5 years, 
manifests features characteristic of theory change in science. In contrast to older 
children, the child at 2 years of age utilises what may be termed an early desire-
perception theory or "simple desire psychology" (Wellman, 1991 ). Such an 
understanding lacks any concept of belief. Furthermore, desire and perception 
seem to be understood as simple non-representational causal links between the 
world and the mind. In this way 2 year olds' understanding is quite different from 
5 year olds' belief-desire psychology, which rests on a conception of internal 
cognitive states representing truths about the world (Wellman, 1991 ). What 
intermediate processes are evident in this change from an early desire-
perception theory to a representational understanding of mind? 
Initially young children with this non-representational theory often deny the 
existence of counter evidence, prime examples being cases of 
misrepresentation. To illustrate, Gopnik & Astington (1988) presented young 
children with objects that looked to be one thing but were really another, such as 
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a 'rock' made of sponge. These children generally said the object was a rock, 
before touching it and discovering its real nature. But when asked what they had 
thought the object was when they first saw it, the children tended to say that they 
had thought all along the object was a sponge. In short, they denied that their 
representation had changed. 
While children may insulate themselves from such counter evidence for a period 
of time, eventually the accumulated weight of such evidence forces changes to 
the early theory. In 3 year olds there is evidence of an 'intermediate phase' in 
which understanding of the existence of representational states is sometimes 
demonstrated, but only in certain situations and only for particular mental states. 
At around three children develop an account of belief (Wellman, i 990); however 
such an account is initially non-representational in character, being modelled on 
an earlier understanding of desire and perception. Hence, as Gopnik and 
Wellman point out, the concept of belief seems to be founded on a reworking of 
earlier theoretical constructs. At this stage belief is clearly not the central 
theoretical construct of the 5 year old's theory, but rather appears to function as 
an auxiliary hypothesis. That is, while realising that people can have mental 
states such as belief, 3 year olds do not yet seem to recognise the centrality of 
belief to a causal account of human action. The first signs of misrepresentation 
also appear to develop in the familiar contexts of desire and perception, and as 
with the concept of belief, are not widely applied. Rather in mirroring the 
scientific case, the new idea so crucial to the later representational theory of 
mind initially functions as an extension of the earlier theory, and is used only to 
deal with what appear to the child to be isolated anomalies. Finally, in the five 
year old, one can witness evidence of a reorganisation of the child's knowledge 
into a coherent representational theory of the mind, one characterised by the 
recognition that "all mental life partakes of the same representational character" 
(Gopnik & Wellman, i 992, p. i 53). 
This sketch has provided only a brief glimpse of how young children reorganise 
their knowledge of the mind. Nevertheless it would seem sufficient to highlight 
some compelling similarities between the process of conceptual change in the 
child, and the process by which knowledge undergoes change in science. In a 
similar manner to scientists, children initially ignore or tolerate anomalies, then 
construct auxiliary hypotheses to deal with the counter evidence, utilise a new 
idea in a restricted way, and eventually reorganise their knowledge so that the 
coherency and explanatory power of the new theory is revealed (Gopnik & 
Wellman, i 992). 
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For some researchers however, drawing on theory change in science to 
illuminate the process of knowledge development in children amounts to an 
overuse of the theory analogy, resulting in knowledge being misconstrued as 
'invented' or constructed by the child, when in fact it is best classed as innate. 
For example, there is a general concern amongst developmentalists over the 
implausibility of a scenario in which children all arrive at a representational 
theory of mind at approximately the same time via a process of individual theory 
construction. A far more likely proposal, contend some, is that what looks like a 
process of theory change is in fact the unfolding of a predetermined sequence or 
innate module. 11 On this view, the changes witnessed in children's ideas about 
the mind are best conceived in terms of maturation rather than theory 
construction. 
Does evidence suggesting that children come to accept similar ideas about the 
mind at around the same time in development necessarily require a maturational 
explanation? Not according to Gopnik (1993), who argues that the uniformity in 
children's developing knowledge of the mind can be accounted for on a theory 
formation view in light of three features of the developmental situation. 
Firstly and rather obviously, children begin in similar 'starting states' to one 
another. 12 However, what is interesting is the richness of this innate cognitive 
endowment. · It appears from infant research on social referencing, joint visual 
attention, and imitation (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Butterworth, 1991; Meltzoff & 
Gopnik, 1993), that we do not have to 'discover' the links between ourselves and 
others, rather these links may be specified innately. Similarly, our folk 
psychological explanation of behaviour in mentalistic terms appears to be 
facilitated by an innate 'head start'. In interpreting human action, children give 
no indication of initially framing their explanations in behaviouristic terms; rather 
it would seem that we begin life with some, albeit primitive, sense of 
psychological causality. One consequence of such an endowment would 
undoubtedly be a certain degree of uniformity in the subsequent pattern of 
development. Hence, while not corresponding to a set of rigid constraints on 
final possibilities (the modularity view of mind), such a rich innate starting state 
would very likely ensure that in our early theoretical deliberations we head off 
down a similar path. 
11 Leslie (1987) is perhaps the most prominent advocate of the proposal that our psychological 
knowledge is encapsulated in a theory-of-mind module. 
12 Gopnik (1993) makes a clear distinction in her work between "modularity nativism" (which she 
rejects) and what she terms "starting-state nativism", the view that our native endowment acts as a 
foundation for our developing psychological understanding, but does not predetermine the final 
form such understanding will take. 
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A second reason why we should anticipate a certain consistency in the pattern of 
children's knowledge development, relates to their ability to construct coherent 
knowledge structures. According to Gopnik (1993), not only do children begin in 
similar starting states, they also have similar theory formation abilities and hence 
will go about operating on the world in a similar manner. While accepting 
Gopnik's point, it would seem as important to recognise the cognitive 
competences underlying our ability to construct a commonsense theory of the 
world, most notably our capacity for meta-representation discussed above, which 
develops in chiidren at around 18 months. Given the centrality of this capacity to 
our understanding of psychological causality, its emergence at 18 months could 
conceivably give the impression that an innate theory-of-mind module is 
unfolding. Indeed it is at precisely this point in development that Leslie (1987) 
postulates the maturation of an innate module to occur. To argue as Leslie does 
that the content of our psychological understanding matures at 18 months is 
however, quite different from the claim presented here, namely that one cognitive 
capacity underlying the child's ability to construct a theory of mind becomes 
evident at this time. 
A final reason why even in the absence of an innate module we would expect 
uniformity in children's developing knowledge of mind, concerns the similarity in 
the patterns of evidence children receive. If it can be accepted that children are 
likely to have similar experiences of mental causation, then the observation that 
children develop a representational theory of mind at around 5 years could, 
Gopnik argues, be likened to the occurrence of independent discoveries in 
science; where similar conceptual developments in a field at a certain time, and 
a similar accumulation of evidence, lead scientists to make independent but 
'synchronized' discoveries. 
Whether or not one finds Gopnik's analogy plausible, it serves to make one point 
clear. Any viable argument for the view that conceptual change in children 
mirrors theory change in science would have to demonstrate not only that 
knowledge restructuring is taking place, but that these changes in the young 
child's theory are related to their experience. Obviously a dramatic 
demonstration of this relation, would be a body of cross-cultural research in 
which children who experienced different evidence regarding the relation 
between the mind and the world, constructed different folk psychological theories 
as a result. 13 While I am unaware of any such research, one study that does 
l3 Here I am thinking of a situation in which different cultures are found to organise the basic 
constructs embodied in a mentalistic construal of human action in a fundamentally different way to 
the schematic presentation outlined in Figure 2 above. Is this a likely scenario? Intuitively, the basic 
belief-desire-action triad that undergirds our adult folk psychology would seem to be fundamental 
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speak on this point provides preliminary support for the parallel between 
conceptual change in children and theory change in science. Bartsch and 
Wellman (1989) in their investigation of 3 year olds' understanding of false belief 
(tasks which 3 year olds typically fail), found that making counter-evidence 
particularly salient to children induced application of the new theoretical idea. 
The fact that it is possible to accelerate the rate of development of children's 
understanding by presenting counter-evidence in an explicit fashion, would 
seem to recommend a theory formation account over other alternatives (e.g., an 
internal maturation view). An investigation of a naturally occurring example of 
this situation had similar findings. Young children who have the benefit of 
interaction with siblings, appear to demonstrate an accelerated understanding of 
false belief in relation to only children (Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994). 
While these studies are in line with a theory formation account, the most 
compelling evidence for the claim that conceptual change in children resembles 
theory change in science is to be found in a closer examination of the pattern of 
development occurring between 2.5 and 5 years that was briefly sketched above. 
In focusing on the conceptual moves executed by the child in the passage from a 
primitive non-representational desire psychology to a fully representational 
theory of mind, one is immediately struck by the logical sequence in the 
progression of ideas, with each conceptual advance seemingly acting as a 
'springboard' for the next (Gopnik, 1990). For example, awareness of the 
representational character of all mental life can be seen to originate in the child's 
ability to form counter-factual representations which are first utilised in pretend 
play. The possibility of alternative representations in the child's imaginary world, 
appears to act as a precursor to the possibility of alternative representations in 
the real world, seen initially in the child's recognition that other people may have 
a different view of the world to themselves. Once established, this idea of 
alternate representations seems to form the foundation for a developing 
awareness that people's representations (including one's own) are subject to 
diversity and change. The concepts of representational diversity and change are 
initially applied by the child in the simpler cases of perception and desire. In the 
final phase of development these concepts are extended to the case of belief as 
the child comes to understand that even people's beliefs will not always 
correspond to the way the world is, and that such discrepancies are indicative of 
their representational status. 14 
to any attempt to interpret human behaviour, and hence would very likely extend across cultural 
boundaries. 
14 This picture of the child's developing understanding of mind is further endorsed by the 
numerous transitional phenomena seen in 3 year olds as they attempt to negotiate the path from a 
nonrepresentational to a representational theory of mind. Being in the midst of a transition from 
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Moreover, researchers investigating this progression in the child's understanding 
of folk psychology have commented on its recursive nature (Gopnik & Wellman, 
1992). Not only does knowledge development proceed in a logical sequence, 
but far from 'unfolding' in any passive way, children seem to build up their 
understanding of the causal structure of the mind, and then reflect on this 
knowledge, reorganising it into a consolidated and generalised framework. For 
example as highlighted above, the idea of representation initially seems to 
function in an ad hoc manner, tagged on to the child's early theory as a way of 
dealing with what at the time appear to be isolated anomalies. Through the 
partial application of this idea, the child seems to build up knowledge of the 
representational nature of mental states, which eventually leads to a 
restructuring of the initial theory and its auxiliary hypotheses into a coherent 
representational understanding of mind. 
In this process of restructuring, children's psychological understanding in a 
similar manner to scientific knowledge can be seen to undergo qualitative 
change. The simple desire-perception theory held by 2 year olds, constitutes a 
conceptual system that is very different to the 5 year old's representational 
understanding of mind. Not only is the younger child's theory devoid of any 
concept of belief, but desire and perception are understood in non-
representational terms. A maturational account that characterised children's 
knowledge acquisition purely as an enrichment of innate structural principles 
(Spelke, 1991 ), would seem inadequate to account for this pattern of 
development. For the conceptual leap seen in older children would not appear 
to be simply a matter of adding more concepts or additional information to the 
existing framework. Rather, in moving from a non-representational view to a fully 
representational theory of mind, children in a similar manner to scientists are 
developing qualitatively new conceptual structures. 15 
Furthermore, if as suggested by the theory analogy children's beliefs about the 
mind are causal-explanatory in character, then the conceptual transition between 
2.5 and 5 years can be seen to afford children increased explanatory power. By 
embracing a fully representational theory of mental states, the 5 year old has at 
one view of the mind to another, these children are found to hold both representational accounts 
of desire and non-representational accounts of belief (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). 
15 Another pointer to theory development is the child's natural language in this period. The 
semantic changes that occur can be seen to mirror semantic change in science (Gopnik, 1982). 
Mental terms appear to act as theoretical terms for the child - they are tied to their immediate 
cognitive problems and undergo change as the child's theory changes. For example, before 3 
years of age children make extensive use of mental terms for desire and perception. Terms relating 
to belief however, only begin appearing in the child's lexicon at around 3 years when an account of 
belief is developed. 
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her disposal a range of explanations and predictions that were not previously 
possible. Cases of false belief and misrepresentation for example, that were 
inexplicable at 2 years of age, can be readily interpreted at 5 years in light of the 
newly developed understanding of the representational status of mental states. 
In effect, by making the conceptual transition from one view of the mind to 
another, children are achieving an increasingly more accurate approximation of 
the mentalistic causal mechanisms that we as adults postulate to be responsible 
for human action. 
Collectively, the pattern of developmental changes in the child's understanding 
of the mind suggests that such progression is best perceived as changes in 
theory. This conclusion is further supported by similar patterns of development in 
children's understanding of biology (Carey, 1985b}, intuitive physics (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1988), and observational astronomy (Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991 ). 
In all of these domains, children are seen to actively integrate information into 
coherent knowledge structures which in turn provide them with a form of 
cognitive economy. These structures undergo qualitative change and they are 
causal-explanatory in character, providing children with the explanatory and 
predictive capacities they require in their everyday attempts to make sense of the 
world. 
In sum, by extending the theory analogy to the process by which children's 
knowledge undergoes development, we see not only that children hold theories 
but that many of the features characteristic of theory change in science, are also 
apparent in the young child's developing understanding of mind. Adopting a 
theory perspective in this stronger sense carries with it certain assumptions 
regarding the cognitive capacities of young children; assumptions that serve to 
challenge traditional depictions of children as fundamentally different types of 
thinkers and learners to adults. Specifically, in likening conceptual change in 
children to the process of theory change in science, the young child is cast in the 
role of an active theoriser; constructing a conceptual framework with which to 
grasp the world and modifying this framework to achieve an increasingly 
effective ordering of experience. The resemblance to scientists in their attempts 
to advance knowledge would seem compelling. 
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3.3 The child as an intuitive scientist · a valuable 
metaphor? 
Recently, a number of researchers have endorsed the metaphor of the child as 
an intuitive scientist as a profitable way of conceptualising children's interaction 
with the world and their development of knowledge (e.g. Brewer & 
Samarapungavan, 1991; Carey, 1985b; Karmiloff-Smith, 1988). This view is 
captured by the following assertion: 
"Clearly, children go about their task as true scientists do, building theories about 
the physical, social and linguistic worlds, rather than reasoning as inductive 
logicians" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1988, p.193). 
In stark contrast however, are those researchers who explicitly reject the 
suggestion that children's problem solving can be equated with the processes 
operative in scientific discovery (D. Kuhn, 1989; diSessa, 1988; Solomon, 1983). 
For example, Deanna Kuhn (1989) takes the following stand: 
" ... the process in terms of which mental models, or theories, are coordinated 
with new evidence is significantly different in the child, the lay adult, and the 
scientist. In some very basic respects, children (and many adults) do not behave 
like scientists" (1989, p.687). 
The view put forward for consideration in this study, is that the child-as-scientist 
metaphor greatly contributes to our understanding of cognitive development, and 
that the reluctance to endorse this metaphor is a manifestation of two pervasive 
beliefs. The first concerns the commonplace notion of what it is to do science 
that was critically examined in Chapter One. The conclusion drawn from this 
chapter was that critics of the child-as-scientist view are basing their assessment 
of childhood competencies on an inappropriate empiricist model of scientific 
rationality. Such a model has served to promote the view that scientists typically 
reason in accordance with the rules of formal logic, and hence has been largely 
responsible for the demarcation of scientific and everyday thought. However as I 
endeavoured to show in Chapter 1, not only does empiricism present a picture of 
scientific inquiry far removed from the everyday problem solving activities of 
young children, it has also been soundly criticised by philosophers and 
historians of science for its failure to capture the reality of scientifc practice. 
When we reject this empiricist model of science as a suitable framework for child-
scientist comparisons and embrace an appropriate realist view, the distinction 
between science and commonsense diminishes and the suggestion that 
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commonsense learning and scientific discovery are in fact continuous processes 
moves rapidly to the fore. 
The second persistent belief that contributes to an assessment of childhood 
thought as non-scientific concerns the cognitive machinery of the young child, 
the implication being that children do not possess the skills required to be 
considered involved in processes analogous to scientific theorising. As such, 
this belief is indicative of the more general child-adult distinction that denies that 
children's thought and methods of inquiry are the same as adults. For example, 
Deanna Kuhn (1989) suggests that children are deficient in the area of relating 
evidence to causal theories, and rather than perceiving a common strategy to 
underlie problem solving endeavours in children and scientists, she suggests 
that co-ordination of theory and evidence is a skill which shows progressive 
degrees of mastery. In Kuhn's opinion so-called expert reasoners (Phd 
candidates in philosophy) employ distinctly different and superior strategies to 
those of children. 
A related claim which contributes to the perceived inferior status of child 
reasoners revolves around the importance of conscious articulation and 
conscious control for scientific thinking, intertwined with the suggestion that 
meta-cognition requires conscious reflection and/or verbalisation. For example, 
Moshman (1979) in a similar manner to Deanna Kuhn argues that it is not just 
the content of children's knowledge that changes with age, but also the nature of 
their theorising. In his view, in contrast to scientists, children demonstrate an 
immaturity in their theorising about the world which is intimately linked to their 
lack of meta-cognitive awareness. Similarly Spelke (1991) rejects the analogy 
between conceptual change in children and theory change in science, on the 
grounds that the radical qualitative change to children's concepts implied by the 
analogy requires the meta-conceptually aware theory-building of scientists. The 
assumed dependence of metacognitive activity on conscious awareness would 
also seem to be a contributing factor to Perner's reluctance to credit young 
children with a capacity for metarepresentation (Perner, 1991 ), and to the 
arguments of simulation theorists such as Gordon (1992) and Goldman (1992) 
who view the proposed existence of scientific theorising in children as 
demanding an anomalous level of precocity. 
Such assessments of childhood thought can, it is suggested, be seen to draw 
support from Piaget's stage-wise analysis of cognitive development, according to 
which cognition is seen to undergo qualitatively different forms as children 
proceed through a fixed sequence of developmental stages: sensorimotor, pre-
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operational, concrete operational, formal operational. Because the cognitive 
structures organising these stages differ so markedly from each other, the theory 
as Wellman (1990) points outs, effectively defines a series of developmentally 
different thinkers. Those opposing the child-as-scientist metaphor can be seen 
to demonstrate a commitment to this definition of cognitive development, by 
endorsing the passage through a set of well-defined stages as a necessary 
precursor to obtaining the level of cognitive maturity witnessed in adult scientists. 
Indeed, both Deanna Kuhn (1989) and Moshman (1979) explicitly cite Piaget's 
claims concerning the attainment of formal operations as a new level of 
cognition, to support their arguments that children are fundamentally different 
thinkers and learners than adults. 
Piaget's stage-dependent view of cognitive development has, especially in the 
last decade, been the subject of much debate and reappraisal (see for example 
Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983; Mandler, 1983; Carey, 1985a). A growing 
consensus amongst developmental psychologists, further supported by 
researchers in science education (e.g. Driver & Easley, .1978; Osborne & 
Wittrock, 1983) is that a content-independent, domain-general formulaton of 
development is incapable of capturing the true nature of developmental change. 
More specifically, the view that young children possess distinctly different and 
inferior mental machinery to adults, has been replaced in much of the recent 
literature by a strong knowledge-based approach to child development. 
Researchers such as Carey (1985a) and Brewer and Samarapungavan (1991) 
argue that the differences apparent in childhood thought when compared to 
adults, are not due to the child's inability to mentally represent certain kinds of 
concepts, or because they lack the capacity to undertake certain logical 
operations. Rather, the differences are seen to result from children's lack of 
domain-specific knowledge. For example, Carey (1985a) in a concerted attempt 
to establish in what sense children think differently to adults, highlights how 
Piaget's seemingly robust experimental demonstrations of both the lack of formal 
operational thought and lack of causal reasoning in the young child, are in fact 
concerned with entities in domains where children do not yet possess the 
relevant domain-specific knowledge. Hence, Carey suggests that Piaget's 
investigations claiming children's thought processes are qualitatively different 
from adults' thought processes, actually confound aspects of domain-
independent reasoning with theory change in certain domains of knowledge 
(Carey, 1985a). 
Such proposals cohere well with the child-as-scientist metaphor, since they 
indicate the distinct possibility that children are not immature reasoners 
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compared with adults but rather differ predominantly in terms of the knowledge 
they possess. Such an argument further implies that in considering children's 
cognitive development, we should not be primarily concerned with tracking the 
child's progress through a sequence of age related stages or developmental 
milestones. Rather our focus should be on detailing the ways in which 
knowledge is acquired and developed as the child interacts with her world. One 
researcher whose work has focused on these 'process-oriented' questions is 
Annette Karmiloff-Smith (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Her findings on children's 
problem solving methods, and the model of cognitive development she has 
developed based on these findings, hold great import for the proposal that the 
child can be viewed as an intuitive scientist. 
3.3.1 The growth of knowledge: 
implications of current cognitive theory for the child-as-
scientist metaphor 
"Children are not satisfied with success in learning to talk or to solve problems; 
they want to understand how they do these things. And in seeking such 
understanding, they become little theorists" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992 p.17). 
Generally speaking, in the developmental literature the predominant concern of 
researchers has been with the content of children's knowledge as opposed to 
'process' considerations. As a result, the methods by which children learn about 
the world have been subject to neglect. This emphasis on content can be seen 
to have carried over into the child-as-scientist literature, where the development 
of children's folk psychological knowledge has been characterised in terms of 
the acquisition of increasingly difficult concepts or the identification of successive 
'levels' of representational understanding. However, as Karmiloff-Smith (1992) 
points out, the specification of macrodevelopmental stages tells us little about 
what motivates change between levels. In effect, such an approach fails to 
provide an account of how knowledge grows. In order to understand how 
learning proceeds, Karmiloff-Smith argues we need a micro-developmental 
approach that focuses on the restructuring of knowledge during actual 
functioning (Karmiloff-Smith, 1984). By taking a 'process oriented' approach, 
Karmiloff-Smith specifies a mechanism responsible for cognitive development 
that provides support for the view that children gain understanding of the world 
through utilisation of theory. 
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In her recent book (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), Karmiloff-Smith draws together ideas 
she has developed over the years concerning the process of understanding in 
children. The result is her theory of "representational redescription"- a model of 
cognitive development, that situates the idea of the child as a "spontaneous 
theoretician" within a broader conceptualisation of how knowledge grows. 
Briefly stated, Karmiloff-Smith views development as essentially a move from 
implicit information embedded in efficiently functioning procedures, to 
progressively more explicit redescriptions of that knowledge. She accounts for 
such development by proposing a model of representational redescription, 
which pivots on the human mind's capacity for metarepresentation. On this 
model, the progressive flexibility of children's representations is explained by 
representational redescription - a cyclical process whereby "information already 
present in the organism's independently functioning, special purpose 
representations is made progressively available ... to other parts of the 
cognitive system" (1992, p.18). 
According to this model, development is characterised in terms of three recurrent 
phases (as opposed to age dependent stages)16 : 
During the first phase children are primarily "data-driven", achieving success on 
the tasks by concentrating on information available in the external environment. 
In this initial phase such behaviour, while successful, is not generated from any 
single underlying representation. Procedural success is followed by an 
"internally driven phase". During this phase, external stimuli are in general 
ignored and internal representations become the focus of developmental 
change. During phase three as a result of the reorganisational processes 
operating in the previous phase, internal representations and external data are 
brought back into alignment with one another. 
Regarding the format of the internal representations involved, Karmiloff-Smith 
argues for a succession of levels at which knowledge is represented and re-
represented: 
Implicit (I-level): At this level representations take the form of procedures, 
activated in response to external stimuli. Level I representations are not 
available as data structures to other parts of the system. 
l6 This is an important point, for it opens up the possibility of theory construction in some domains 
(for example folk psychology) at an early age. This aspect of Karmiloff-Smith's theory has however 
been subject to misinterpretation in the developmental literature. Deanna Kuhn (1989), for 
example, uses both Piaget's and Karmiloff-Smith's models of development to endorse her 
proposal that children are incapable of scientific thinking because they have yet to reach the level 
of cognition that such thought requires. In effect, Kuhn incorrectly takes Karmiloff-Smith's account 
to be an age dependent stage theory. 
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Explicit (E-1 level): Once automatisation of these procedures has been 
achieved, a metaprocess is set in motion, redescribing the procedurally 
embedded knowledge into an explicit form. This process can be self generating. 
At this level, the now explicitly represented knowledge is available as data 
structures to other parts of the cognitive system. It is here that the signs of a 
cognitively flexible system begin to appear, that is, it is these redescribed 
representations that serve to form the basis for children's subsequent theory-
building. 
(E-2 and E-3 levels): Knowledge is further redescribed to become available to 
conscious access and finally to the point where it is verbally stateable. 17 
In sum, Karmiloff-Smith builds on her claim that the child is a spontaneous 
theoretician by providing an account of the developmental process through 
which knowledge is 'made ready' in the mind (i.e., explicitly represented) for 
subsequent theory building. 18 On this account, children are not seen to think 
and learn in a fundamentally different way to adults. Rather the hypothesized 
process of representational redescription operates to make possible cognitively 
flexible and creative thought in children and adults alike. As such, this current 
theory of cognitive development (in marked contrast to traditional accounts) can 
be seen to provide support for the child-as-scientist metaphor, since in its 
explication of the growth of knowledge it demonstrates that even young children 
can be profitably viewed as theory builders. More specifically, by endorsing the 
view that children construct theories, Karmiloff-Smith's work indicates that a 
fruitful avenue for developing the metaphor lies in a concern with the methods or 
strategies children and scientists utilise to advance knowledge of the world. 
Seeking to develop the child-as-scientist metaphor in this way, by setting up a 
comparison between the methods of inquiry utilised in science and children's 
problem solving in the everyday domain, becomes the orienting focus for 
Chapter 4. 
17 The fact that Karmiloff-Smith argues for more than two levels of representation is, I think, crucial 
to the claim that the young child is a theory builder. As she herself notes, developmentalists have 
tended to perceive the representational system in terms of a dichotomy between implicitly stored 
procedural knowledge and explicit consciously accessible knowledge that is capable of being 
stated in a verbal form. This dichotomy, I believe, underlies the claim that young children are not 
capable of constructing theories since their knowledge is not yet available to conscious access. 
However, if we accept Karmiloff-Smith's conception of E I level representations in which knowledge 
is. explicitly represented and available as data to the system, but not yet consciously accessible to 
the child, then we can see a potential base for children's subsequent theorising. Examples of 'E I 
representations' drawn from studies with children, appear throughout Karmiloff-Smith's book 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). 
l8 In her most recent work (Clark & Karmiloff-Smith, 1993), Karmiloff-Smith turns her attention to 
connectionist modelling (more specifically PDP or parallel distributed processing) in an attempt to 
articulate in more detail the functioning of this theory building mechanism and so provide further 
support for her model of cognitive development. 
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4 
The growth of knowledge in science and 
commonsense: extending the analogy 
As indicated in Section 3.3, the first three chapters of this study have been 
concerned to demonstrate the plausibility of the child-as-scientist metaphor by 
tackling two widely embraced distinctions in the literature that threaten to 
undermine it: the separation of science and commonsense as fundamentally 
different types of endeavour, and the demarcation of children's and adult's 
thought on the basis of the young child's deficient cognitive machinery. Having 
drawn on contemporary philosophy of science and recent findings in the 
developmental literature to dismantle these distinctions and hence provide 
support for the child-as-scientist metaphor, this chapter looks at ways to further 
develop comparisons between children and scientists, so as to engender a 
fruitful characterisation of knowledge acquisition in childhood. 
The proposal to be investigated in this chapter, is that a concern with method 
informed by a realist perspective on science illuminates compelling similarities 
between the growth of knowledge in science and commonsense, and hence 
provides researchers with the most profitable approach to developing the child-
as-scientist metaphor. In looking to substantiate this proposal, three lines of 
support recommend themselves for consideration. 
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The first of these concerns the recent work on the process of knowledge 
development in children (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), that was reviewed above. By 
characterising children's problem solving in terms of theory formation, and 
providing justification for this characterisation via investigations of the operation 
of a mechanism in human cognitive systems that makes such theory building 
possible, Karmiloff-Smith convincingly overturns the belief that the capacity for 
theory construction is available only to meta-conceptually aware scientists. In its 
place she paints a picture of theory formation as the fundamental problem 
solving mode of humans, and hence alerts researchers to a basis for comparing 
children and scientists in terms of the process by which they impose conceptual 
order on the world. A methodological approach to the child-as-scientist 
metaphor which looks to facilitate a development of this theory-building 
characterisation can, it is suggested, be seen as a natural extension of Karmiloff-
Smith's research indicating that the child is a 'spontaneous theoretician'. 
Proposing that as researchers we should be looking to compare children and 
scientists in terms of the methods by which, they attempt to develop knowledge of 
the world, is also consistent with the tenets of Evolutionary Naturalistic Realism, 
a theory which serves to provide the philosophical framework for this study. In 
recognising our situation in the world as creatures evolving from an original 
position of ignorance, ENR places great import on the task of articulating a 
realistic strategy for advancing knowledge. Indeed as indicated in Chapter 1, 
method is central to ENR, for as Hooker (1987) points out, once we recognise the 
absence of any foundational knowledge upon which to erect an epistemology, a 
study of the methods of relieving ignorance remains the only path open to us. 
Moreover, ENR by characterising science as a refined outgrowth of our everyday 
attempts to make sense of the world, gives us reason to expect continuity 
between science and commonsense at the methodological level. This in turn 
implies that an adequate theory of scientific method should also have application 
in everyday contexts. 
A final reason for adopting a methodological perspective to elucidate similarities 
between children and scientists, concerns the fertility of existing approaches to 
developing the child-as-scientist metaphor. To date, with the exception of 
Karmiloff-Smith's work, such developments have been primarily concerned with 
detailing similarities between children's acquisition of knowledge in a particular 
domain (e.g., folk psychology, folk physics, folk biology), and the development of 
knowledge in the history of science. Formulating the analogy in terms of 
comparisons with the history of science however, would seem to exhibit a 
number of limitations, most notably the problem of equivalence in juxtaposing 
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changes in the conceptual system of an individual with a model of revolutionary 
theory change in science, and the subsequent neglect of methodological 
questions regarding the processes by which human knowers in fact develop 
such knowledge in everyday and scientific contexts. 
In light of the goal of facilitating a fruitful characterisation of knowledge 
development in children, this chapter will constitute a critical evaluation of these 
current attempts to extend the child-as-scientist metaphor via comparisons with 
the history of science. Following this evaluation an alternative formulation of the 
metaphor will be drafted, in which it is suggested that comparisons between 
children and scientists are most profitably developed at the methodological levei. 
Utilising a realist perspective on scientific method consistent with Evolutionary 
Naturalistic Realism, an attempt will be made to demonstrate how an adequate 
theory of scientific inquiry has the potential to extend Karmiloff-Smith's theory 
building characterisation of children's problem solving, thereby facilitating an 
informative perspective on cognitive development. This chapter concludes that 
investigating the relations between children and scientists from a methodological 
viewpoint, has much to recommend it as a programme for future research. 
Specifically, by drawing on a general theory of scientific method to delineate 
similarities between science and commonsense, researchers are able to take 
advantage of a theoretical tool designed to illuminate the process of knowledge 
advance in science to enhance their understanding of the process of learning in 
childhood. 
4.1 The development of knowledge in children 
and the history of science: evidence for 
recapitulation? 
The aim of Chapter 3 was to indicate the plausibility of the child-as-scientist 
metaphor by focusing on the young child's development of ideas about the mind 
and its relation to the world. Having drawn on research suggesting general 
parallels between children and scientists in terms of both the theoretical nature of 
their knowledge and the process by which such knowledge undergoes 
development, the obvious next step is to consider how a development of these 
child-scientist relations is best achieved. Karmiloff-Smith's theorising outlined in 
Chapter 3, supports the adoption of a methodological perspective on the child-
as-scientist debate, however to date her suggestions regarding such a 'process 
oriented' approach have not been taken up by researchers in the field. Instead, 
analogies between science and commonsense have generally been pursued by 
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identifying children's conceptual development with macrodevelopmental stages 
in the history of science. In these 'history-of-science' comparisons two research 
camps can be discerned - those who argue for some form of content 
recapitulation between early scientific theories and intuitive concepts, and those 
researchers who propose that ontogeny-historical development correlations are 
best explored at the structural level. In this section, an attempt will be made to 
evaluate these two approaches to developing the analogy between science and 
commonsense, before going on to outline my conception of an alternative way 
forward for child-scientist comparisons in Section 4.2. 
4.1.1 Content analogies: are intuitive theories a 'reinvention' 
of medieval views? 
The idea that the explanatory frameworks held by beginners in certain domains 
are modern day recreations of early scientific theories, is an intriguing hypothesis 
and one that has attracted attention from students of the novice-expert shift. 
Following such a line of inquiry, researchers interested in the changes that occur 
as novices in particular domains gain expertise, have uncovered some striking 
similarities between the views that novices bring to instruction and those held by 
early scientists. Considering that the young child is commonly taken to be the 
proto-typical novice, these findings hold much import for the comparisons 
between children and scientists considered in this study. 
Of those focusing on content analogies, Michael McCloskey and coworkers 
(Mccloskey, 1983; Caramazza, Mccloskey & Green, 1981; Mccloskey & Kohl, 
1983; McCloskey & Kargon, 1988) provide the most indepth examination of 
similarities that appear to hold between modern intuitions and early science. 
Their investigations of people's intuitive ideas about the motion of inanimate 
objects, suggest that novices in physics hold conceptions of motion which are 
fundamentally at odds with the basic tenets of classical physics. These 
conceptions can be seen to stem from a systematic theory of motion which is very 
resistant to tuition and which interestingly, closely resembles a pre-Newtonian 
theory of mechanics embraced by medieval scientists in the 14th-16th centuries 
(Mccloskey, 1983). This theory dubbed the "impetus theory of motion", pivots on 
two central assumptions, both of which are apparent in early scientific writings 
and in the descriptions and explanations of motion given by modern day 
students: 
i) setting an object in motion invests the object with a force or impetus which is 
responsible for maintaining the object's motion. 
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ii) this impetus expends over time, causing the moving object to gradually slow 
down and eventually come to a halt. 
According to McCloskey and Kargon (1988), such resemblances between the 
two theories are not restricted to this basic idea of 'no motion without force'. 
Rather, commonalities uncovered between novices' conceptions of motion and 
those of medieval scientists were found to extend to assumptions concerning the 
existence of a curvilinear impetus, the cause/causes of impetus dissipation, the 
question of how an object is invested with an impetus, and the ways in which the 
internal impetus of a moving object interacts with the external force of gravity. 
Correspondences between the content of novices' conceptual systems and 
those of early scientists have also been articulated in other domains. For 
example, Marianne Wiser (Wiser & Carey, 1983; Wiser, 1988) investigating the 
concepts of heat and temperature, presents a case for the existence of parallels 
between the thermal model held by modern students and the historical model of 
thermal entities utilised by 17th century Florentine scientists known as 'the 
Experimenters'. In both models, heat and temperature were found to comprise a 
single undifferentiated concept which could not be adequately described as 
simply a mixture of the two modern concepts. Moreover, the novices' concept 
was seen to share many additional characteristics with the early scientists' 
concept, as well as constraining explanations of phenomena in a similar manner. 
Most recently, content analogies have been uncovered by researchers studying 
young children's developing understanding in the domain of observational 
astronomy. Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) in their investigations of children's 
mental models of the day/night cycle, comment on the similarity between the 
models they attribute to children on the basis of their drawings and explanations 
of the day/night sequence, and those held by early astronomers. 
Collectively, such findings raise the initial plausibility of the claim that meaningful 
parallels can be drawn between intuitive knowledge and early scientific theories 
on the basis of content. Given these correspondences, and bearing in mind that 
the aim of this chapter is to develop the child-as-scientist metaphor, we can ask 
what advantages are to be gained by pursuing the analogy between science and 
comonsense via a content recapitulation thesis? 
Perhaps the most far reaching benefit of such an approach is the positive 
perception it offers of intuitive knowledge. Using historical theories as a guide to 
unravelling beginners' concepts in various domains, has the effect of casting the 
conceptual system the novice brings to instruction in the role of an alternative 
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framework to 'official science' (Driver & Easley, 1978). Raising the novice's 
ideas to the status of a coherent explanatory system that competes with accepted 
scientific theory as an explanation of phenomena, stands in marked contrast to 
traditional treatments of novices' intuitions. Prior to comparisons with the history 
of science, such treatments of the novice-expert shift (also known revealingly as 
the naive-expert shift) were in the main constructed solely with a view to the 
accepted or 'correct' account embodied in the expert's conceptual system. This 
assessment has not surprisingly led to a widely endorsed perception of novices' 
concepts as impoverished, incomplete, and error-laden in relation to those held 
by experts (Wiser, 1988). 
Such negative characterisations are predicated on the assumption that the 
conceptual system held by the expert provides the researcher with an 
appropriate standard against which to assess the adequacy of the novices' 
beliefs and hence that any deviation from this standard deserves a 'substandard' 
classification. For this to be the case, novices and experts must share the same 
conceptual system, with the novice merely failing to grasp it in its entirety, or 
holding some aspects of it imperfectly. The findings of those researchers who 
have traded a normative approach for a concern with reconstructing the 
conceptual world view of the novice aided by an historical model however, point 
to the inaccuracy of this assumption. Investigations of intuitive conceptual 
systems indicate that like the early scientist, the novice in a particular domain 
does not hold a substandard version of the later accepted or 'correct' model held 
by the expert but a different explanatory model altogether, that embodies 
different concepts and different explanatory mechanisms, and as a result 
provides an alternative conceptualisation of phenomena in the domain to be 
explained (Wiser & Carey, 1983; McCloskey & Kargon, 1988). 
The reconceptualisation of the novice-expert shift that results from such 
investigations then, suggests that the history of science provides a positive 
heuristic for illuminating the richness of intuitive knowledge. Instead of focusing 
on what the novice lacks against the backdrop of the experts' conceptual system, 
novices' intuitions are explored in their own right as early theoretical attempts to 
impose conceptual order on the problem domain. While recognising the utility of 
medieval science as a working model for detailing novices' explanatory 
frameworks, there is however a need to query how far analogies on the basis of 
content can realistically be developed. It would seem implausible from an 
intuitive standpoint to suggest that modern novices are in fact reproducing early 
scientists' views. Examining the research on content correspondences between 
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students' views and the history of science, indicates further reasons for rejecting 
a content recapitulation thesis. 
Firstly, the similarities witnessed between early scientists' theories and those of 
modern day students in a certain domain do not amount to absolute identity, with 
the modern explanatory framework tracing the earlier theory in all of its details. 
Wiser and Carey (1983) commenting on the possibility of content recapitulation, 
suggest that an analysis of the relevant conceptual systems in their entirety (i.e. 
including domain, explanatory mechanisms, and individual concepts) would 
serve to reveal the limited capacity in which early science can be said to re-
emerge in modern intuitive views. Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) for example, 
highlight points of comparison between the early mental models of day/night 
cycle seen in young children and the categorisation of astronomical objects 
drawn by Ptolemy, but there is no suggestion that the young child's views are in 
any way complex enough to be seen as a reproduction of the Ptolemic 
conceptual system as a whole.19 
A second reason for disputing a content recapitulation thesis, is the unlikely 
discovery of parallel sequences of development. To argue for a strict form of 
recapitulation one would presumably be required to map novices' views to early 
science at successive points along the developmental path in order to 
demonstrate that modern students (or children) proceed through similar stages in 
the content of their ideas to those witnessed in the history of science. To date, 
researchers investigating content correspondences between the views of 
modern novices and scientists of an earlier age have focused their attention on 
singular points in the history of a particular discipline, however those who 
address the possibility of corresponding longitudinal developments reject the 
likelihood of comparisons extending beyond mere convergences. Wiser (1988) 
to take one example, argues that the caloric theory was an important 
intermediary between the model held by the Experimenters to which novices' 
concepts were compared and kinetic theory in the history of thermal physics, yet 
no evidence of a similar developmental parallel is found in modern day students. 
l9 Mccloskey (1983) and Wiser (1988) do provide evidence for some rather extensive similarities 
between early scientific theories and modern intuitions, however dissimilarities are also clearly 
evident. Some of these dissimilarities would seem to stem from the early scientist and the modern 
novice being exposed to different world views provided by the science of the age. For example, 
novices' contact with modern scientific ideas results in the construction of beliefs that are markedly 
different from those held by early scientists (e.g. heat is conceived as energy rather than as a 
substance (Wiser, 1988}; gravity is taken to be a downward force external to the object as opposed 
to a characteristic (natural heaviness} of the object itself (McCloskey, 1983}}. 
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A final reason for questioning the adoption of a content recapitulation thesis as 
the preferred avenue for extending the analogy between science and 
commonsense, is given by McCloskey and Kargon (1988) in their explanation of 
why correspondences exist between the views of medieval scientists and those 
held by novice students. According to these researchers, similarities in content 
are the result of both parties being at the same early stage of theory formation. A 
number of investigators (Strauss, 1988; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994; Wiser, 1988) 
hint that the likely reason for the perceived likeness between early science and 
intuitive knowledge, is that theoretical beginnings in a scientific domain are 
usually heavily dependent upon everyday experience and therefore close to the 
commonsense knowledge held by laypeople. McCloskey and Kargon (1988) go 
further to cite T. S. Kuhn's structural account of the four levels a discipline 
proceeds through prior to the establishment of a paradigm and to argue that 
medieval scientists and novices in physics are operating at the same level in this 
crystallisation process (i.e. level 3 - where theoretical entities are defined and 
attempts are made to establish causal connections between them). This 
suggests that the perceived similarities in content in fact result from structural 
parallels existing between the development of knowledge in individuals and the 
development of knowledge in the history of science. This being the case, a more 
profitable characterisation of knowledge acquisition in childhood is likely to be 
secured by concentrating on attempts to develop the analogy between science 
and commonsense along a structural dimension. Accordingly the work of those 
researchers who have articulated the analogy in structural terms, becomes the 
focus of the following section. 
4.1.2 Structural analogies: does knowledge acquisition in 
ontogenesis mirror historical development in science? 
While content correspondences between intuitive conceptions and early science 
exhibit limitations, they are as indicated above suggestive of potentially more 
informative parallels at the structural level. Specifically, endowing beginners in a 
conceptual domain with an early framework theory that stands as an alternative 
to the later explanatory framework held by experts not only serves to highlight the 
richness of intuitive knowledge, it also says something significant about the 
nature of the move required between the two conceptual systems. For example 
by identifying similarities between the young child's cosmology and the Ptolemic 
conceptual system, Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) emphasise the conceptual 
divide that separates the young child's views from the currently accepted 
heliocentric framework. This in turn suggests that navigating the passage 
7 1 
between the two will require greater conceptual reorganisation than the simple 
addition or deletion of one or two isolated beliefs (see also Wiser, 1988). The 
question naturally arises whether such restructuring takes a similar form to theory 
change in the history of science? 
Susan Carey takes up this question in her research on children's acquisition of 
biological knowledge and their developing understanding of physical concepts 
(Carey, 1985b; 1988; 1992; Smith, Carey & Wiser, 1985).20 Looking to unravel 
the analogy in more detail with a view to achieving an accurate description of 
knowledge acquisition in childhood, she focuses attention in her 1985 
monograph on three issues: the organisation of children's biological knowledge, 
the extent to which this knowledge undergoes change, and the ways (if any) in 
which these changes resemble the restructuring evident in theory change in 
science. Having articulated the view that intuitive knowledge is organised within 
framework theories and that reorganisation of such conceptual systems is best 
seen in terms of conceptual change and belief revision, Carey draws on 
evidence to argue that the types of changes occuring in the child's knowledge of 
animals and living things between the ages of 4 and 1 O appear to be of the same 
kind and magnitude as the conceptual restructuring proposed by philosophers 
(e.g. Kuhn, 1970) to characterise historical development in science. 
In making this claim, Carey (1985b) contrasts two different types of restructuring 
thought to occur during knowledge acquisition. The first labelled 'weak 
restructuring' which is taken by some researchers to describe the novice-expert 
shift, involves changes in the relations holding between concepts in a certain 
domain, and as a result of these changes the formation of new abstract 
schemata. 21 The second, much more radical sense of restructuring which Carey 
calls 'strong restructuring', derives its form from contemporary commentary on 
theory change in the history of science (Kuhn, 1970). On this view of the 
knowledge acquisition process, three interrelated changes are seen to be 
involved in the move from one conceptual system to another; these being 
changes in the nature of the domain, in the type of explanatory mechanisms 
20 While a number of writers have phrased ontogeny-historical development comparisons in 
structural terms (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Kitcher, 1988; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994), Carey's 
research program represents, I think, the most comprehensive development of the proposal that 
structural parallels exist between conceptual change in children and theory change in science. 
Hence my evaluation of the profitability of adopting a structural recapitulation thesis for developing 
the child-as-scientist metaphor will focus on Carey's presentation. 
21 21 For example, Larkin (1981) has suggested that the differences between novices and 
experts in the domain of physics can be described in full by appeal to these two forms of change. 
The more recent investigations of the novice-expert shift considered in my discussion of content 
recapitulation however, would seem to be more appropriately described in terms of strong 
restructuring. 
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utilised to account for phenomena, and in the individual concepts at the core of 
the theoretical system (Kuhn, 1970). 
According to Carey, the key difference between these two types of knowledge 
restructuring lies in the presence or absence of conceptual change. In examples 
of weak restructuring, concepts do not change, only the relations between them 
do. In theory change in science by contrast, the core concepts of two successive 
theories are often found to be markedly different to the extent that attempts to 
translate terms from the earlier theory to its successor are often thwarted (Kuhn, 
1970). 
In comparing the evidence for knowledge reorganisation in children's conceptual 
systems against these two different models of restructuring, Carey concludes that 
the changes seen to occur as young children acquire biological understanding 
between the ages of 4 and 10, cannot be adequately described in terms of weak 
restructuring. The crux of her argument (see Carey 1985b for details), is that the 
difference between young children's and adults' conceptual systems is not 
merely a difference in the volume of knowledge held and/or in the relations 
existing between concepts; there is also evidence of major structural 
reorganisation involving changes in domain, explanatory structure, and most 
importantly changes at the level of individual concepts. According to Carey, 
because of their severe lack of biological knowledge young children organise 
their understanding of biological processes and activities not in terms of their 
biological function in sustaining life which they have yet to learn, but in 
accordance with their knowledge of people and the role these activities play in 
human intercourse (Carey, 1985b). In Carey's view, 4 year olds do not yet 
possess an autonomous domain of biological knowledge, so in facing questions 
about biological processes and activities they inevitably resort to their folk 
psychological explanatory framework. 
During the period 4-1 0 years, development is construed as the emergence of an 
intuitive biology out of the parent folk psychological framework, becoming a 
separate domain of theorising by 10 years of age. Highlighted in this structural 
reorganisation are changes in explanatory mechanisms (from 
psychological/social to biological), and conceptual change. Using the move from 
Aristotelian to Galilean mechanics as a paradigm example of strong restructuring 
in science, Carey identifies two kinds of conceptual change, differentiation and 
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coalescence, which she argues are also apparent in children's acquisition of 
biological knowledge. 22 
Having given some initial indications that the structural analogy holds between 
conceptual development in children and theory change in the history of science, 
Carey (1988, 1992) accepts the licence to develop her proposal by calling on a 
theoretical framework that is often cited by researchers attempting to make sense 
of strong restructuring in science: Kuhn's doctrine of incommensurability. 
Couching her proposal in terms of 'local incommensurability' (Kuhn, 1982), she 
argues that children and adults can be seen to hold "incommensurable 
conceptual systems" and therefore the passage from one to the other, like similar 
moves in the history of science, will necessarily involve conceptual change. 
The revised view of incommensurability in Kuhn's 1982 paper from which Carey 
draws her insights, allows her to counter a number of apriori reasons why 
positing incommensurability between children and adults would seem 
implausible, the most prominent of these being questions of communication and 
interpretation.23 Carey succeeds in showing that these objections can be seen 
to stem from a more general assumption lying at the heart of a strong nativist 
position on the development of commonsense knowledge, namely the view that 
the child's conceptual system is an impoverished subset of the adult's and 
conceptual development is primarily a matter of enrichment (see for example 
Spelke, 1991 ). As she demonstrates, such a position on cognitive development 
demands the discontinuity of science and commonsense since it decrees that 
knowledge acquisition in children does not involve conceptual change. One way 
in which to counter this nativist perspective would be to provide evidence of 
continuity between children's conceptual development and conceptual 
development in science. In arguing for developmental cases of 
22 For example Carey suggests that the child at 4 years due to the paucity of their biological 
knowledge, fails to differentiate 'dead' (e.g. a dead person) from 'inanimate' (e.g. a stuffed toy). 
While both are senses of 'not alive', the 1 O year old according to Carey can differentiate the two by 
identifying death as a biological phenomenon involving the cessation of bodily functions. With 
regard to coalescence, Carey argues that 4 year olds do not possess the biological knowledge 
necessary to make the connection between animals and plants and hence do not see any reason 
for including the two in a single category. 10 year olds in contrast recognise the biological basis 
common to both animals and plants, and this knowledge facilitates the coalescence of the two into 
the superordinate category 'living thing' (Carey, 1985b). 
23 Kuhn (1982) presents a somewhat amended version of incommensurability in which he argues: 
a) that incommensurability does not imply incomparability - locally incommensurable theories will still 
share many terms whose meanings have been preserved during the process of theory change and 
which therefore provide a basis for inter-theory comparison; and b) 'interpretation' needs to be 
distinguished from 'translation' - a theory which defies translation can still be comprehended by 
those holding an incommensurable successor through the processes of interpretation and 
language acquisition. Equating the two prevents us from seeing how communication between 
holders of incommensurable theories is possible. 
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incommensurability comparable to historical cases of incommensurability, Carey 
(1992) is attempting just that. 
From the outline of Carey's research programme given above, it would appear 
that a concern with structural correspondences between children's knowledge 
acquisition and the development of knowledge in science, provides a more 
profitable conceptualisation of the child-as-scientist metaphor than the content 
recapitulation thesis that was examined earlier. In addition to being intuitively 
more plausible, positing structural correspondences allows researchers to move 
beyond a static conception of knowledge and broach the issue of how 
knowledge changes over the course of development. Such structural 
comparisons were seen in Chapter 3 to provide researchers with some useful 
ideas concerning the processes by which children develop knowledge of the 
world. For example, by drawing on the history of astronomy to highlight 
characteristic features of theory change in science, Gopnik and Wellman (1992) 
were able to plot a similar sequence of progression in the preschool child's 
transition from a belief-desire psychology to a fully representational theory of 
mind.24 
More generally, Carey's explicit focus on the organisation of children's 
knowledge within conceptual domains and the changes to this organisation over 
the course of development, make it clear that simple accretion of information is 
not the only alternative to global restructuring models that posit domain general 
change. A third possibility exists in a domain specific restructuring account that 
conceives development as principally a matter of theory change from one 
theoretical framework to an incommensurable successor (Carey, 1992). 
Developing such a position however, does as Carey is well aware, rest crucially 
on the strong restructuring model being true, with conceptual change in children 
being shown to be of the same kind and magnitude as conceptual change 
witnessed in the history of science. Evaluating Carey's argument for the efficacy 
of a structural recapitulation thesis in illuminating cognitive development, this is 
my first point of concern. 
24 A concern with structural correspondences between children's conceptual development and 
the history of science, also allows researchers the flexibility to make comparisons across domains, 
rather than being restricted by a focus on content to within-domaih analyses. In the example 
highlighted above, Gopnik and Wellman (1992) utilise the Copernican Revolution to illuminate the 
developmental path of folk psychology. Similarly, Carey looks to the conceptual restructuring that 
occured between Aristotelian and Galilean mechanics to inform her proposals regarding children's 
acquisition of biological knowledge. 
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Does conceptual change in children deserve to be called revolutionary? 
In articulating her model of strong restructuring to which she compares children's 
conceptual development and in her subsequent dependence on Kuhn's notion 
of incommensurability in her descriptions of knowledge acquisition in childhood, 
Carey is concerned to show that conceptual changes in children are of the same 
sort as conceptual changes in the history of science. A recent work on the nature 
of conceptual change (Thagard, 1992) however, casts some doubt on this 
'identity' proposal. According to Thagard, who outlines a cognitive theory of 
revolutionary conceptual change which he then uses to examine historical cases 
in science, scientific revolutions involve conceptual transformations that far 
exceed those detailed by Carey to characterise children's knowledge 
acquisition. 
In making this claim, Thagard presents a computational account of concepts in 
which conceptual systems are seen to be structured primarily via kind and part-
whole hierarchies. According to this account, conceptual change can be simple, 
for example when it involves the addition of concept nodes or links between 
nodes; or it can be complex, when changes in kind and part relations involving 
the rejection of existing relations lead to substantial reorganisation of the 
conceptual system. An example of this more dramatic kind of change provided 
by Thagard is the restructuring that occured with Darwin's reclassification of 
humans as a kind of animal (as opposed to a fundamentally different kind of 
creature argued to be created in God's own image). Thagard labels this kind of 
change "branch jumping", since it involves the movement of the concept 'human' 
from one branch of the kind-hierarchy to another. According to Thagard, the only 
type of conceptual change more radical than branch jumping is a change in the 
organising principle of the hierarchical tree itself, what he terms "tree switching". 
This form of change is also illustrated in the Darwinian revolution; under Darwin 
the notion of kind changed from being one of similarity to become an historical 
notion, with classification of kind based on common descent (Thagard, 1992). 
Drawing on this theory of conceptual change allows Thagard to rank change 
according to its severity, calculated as a measure of its impact on the structure of 
the conceptual system as a whole, and as a result identify and compare the 
degrees of conceptual change that have occured in different theoretical systems. 
Comparing the history of science and children's conceptual development, 
Thagard reveals that while all seven of the scientific revolutions examined 
involved changes of the most radical sort (i.e. branch jumping and/or tree 
switching), these kinds of conceptual change were notably absent in children's 
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acquisition of biological knowledge. Moreover, the kinds of conceptual change 
that were identified by Carey in children's knowledge acquisition are according 
to Thagard only simple conceptual changes, since in considering their impact on 
the structure of the conceptual system as a whole, they result merely in the 
extension of existing relations, rather than their rejection or subjection to a 
fundamental reorganisation. 25 Thus Thagard concludes that despite Carey's 
'identity' proposal, conceptual changes occuring in children are not as radical as 
conceptual changes that have occured in the history of science. Endorsing this 
conclusion holds further negative implications for the picture of development that 
has emerged from the 'conceptual change as theory change' analogy. 
Theory replacement: an accurate depiction of knowledge development in 
ontogenesis? 
According to Carey's thesis, knowledge acquisition in ontogenesis and in the 
history of science exhibit parallel sequences of development; both involve theory 
change from one theoretical framework to an incommensurable successor. In 
her case study of children's acquisition of biological knowledge for example, she 
argues for the emergence of a completely new theory of biology between the 
ages of 4 and 1 O years that replaces the earlier behavioural/psychological theory 
as an explanatory framework for understanding biological processes and 
activities. If however as Thagard suggests, children's knowledge acquisition 
does not involve radical conceptual transformations, then this claim for parallel 
sequences of development would also seem in dispute. 
Such a view seems to be shared by a number of other developmental 
researchers who reject Carey's claim that children's knowledge acquisition is 
best seen in terms of theory replacement. Keil (1989) for example, argues that 
contra Carey, a rudimentary biological theory distinct from folk psychology is 
present from the earliest years, and hence development consists in the 
elaboration and differentiation of this pre-existing theoretical framework. 
Vosniadou and Brewer (1994) also think that Carey's claims are not upheld by 
the developmental evidence. In their view, knowledge acquisition involves more 
than enrichment but cannot be adequately described in terms of the direct 
25 This difference between 'simple' and 'complex' kinds of conceptual change can be exemplified 
by returning to Thagard's characterisation of the Darwinian revolution. There is no indication that 
children go through a similar kind of branch jumping move to Darwin between 4 and 1 o years, 
recategorising humans as a kind of animal. Children already recognise relations between people 
and animals (for the young child people are the proto-typical animal), and acquiring biological 
knowledge does not appear to lead to the abandonment of these relations, merely the formation of 
new linkages. Thagard tells a similar story for the coalescence of 'animal' and 'plant' between 4 and 
10 years. Once again there is no rejection of existing relations, only the addition of new ones, 
prompting the formation of the superordinate concept 'living thing'. 
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replacement of one theory with another. Instead their theoretical position 
appears to take a 'middle road' between these two alternatives, explaining 
conceptual change in terms of a revolving hierarchy of constraints on children's 
initial models of the world. Finally Chi (1988) who also investigates the 
development of children's biological knowledge, posits a more gradual 
developmental process than one akin to revolutionary change in the history of 
science. Rather than theory replacement, she argues for a weak restructuring 
model that sees children undergoing a changing shift in emphasis, whereby the 
association of 'alive' with movement becomes less salient as biological functions 
move to the fore.26 
A review of Carey's claims for structural recapitulation then, would seem to 
indicate that while similarities do exist between the growth of knowledge in 
children and theory change in the history of science, there are also some 
important differences; most notably in terms of the kinds of conceptual change 
occuring in ontogenesis compared with historical development in science, and 
more generally with regards to the question of theory replacement as an 
accurate description of knowledge acquisition in childhood. This in turn 
indicates that a structural recapitulation model such as that proposed by Carey in 
a similar manner to content analogies discussed earlier, is best viewed as a 
heuristic approach that provides a useful working model for children's 
knowledge development, but is insufficient to support an accurate description of 
that development in any degree of detail. The reason for this I suggest, is 
primarily a problem of equivalence that arises in comparing the developmental 
process in the child with the developmental process in the institution of science. 
The problem: institutional change vs individual theory construction 
In her comparisons of conceptual change in children with theory change in the 
history of science, Carey draws on T. S. Kuhn's theory of scientific development 
in order to account for what are effectively the theorising efforts of individual 
children. The most prominent example is her reliance on Kuhn's notion of 
incommensurability, which she utilises to draw attention to the conceptual divide 
existing between children's theoretical understanding in particular domains and 
that of adults. In articulating this notion, and in constructing his theory of scientific 
development more generally however, Kuhn was not concerned with the 
individual scientist. Rather, his is a structural account of the development of 
science in general terms, on which it is the scientific community and not the 
26 Significantly, Carey while arguing for theory replacement, has elsewhere termed the early 
theory held by young children a "vitalist biology". 
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scientist as an individual that is the 'agent' of scientific activity (see Hoyningen-
Huene, 1993). Hence in drawing on Kuhn's ideas to investigate children's 
knowledge acquisition, Carey is appealing to terms and criteria that were 
originally formulated to account for social processes of change in the institution 
of science. 
The result of this situation is that a Kuhnian account of scientific development will 
demonstrate limitations in its application to the growth of knowledge in children. 
Some of these limitations placed on child-as-scientist considerations were 
outlined above, regarding the failure of revolutionary descriptions of scientific 
change to accurately capture the path of knowledge development in children. An 
even bigger failing in my view is the absence of any clues as to the methods by 
which children generate, develop, and appraise their knowledge construction 
efforts. Despite an unorthodox interpretation by Giere (1988), on which he 
examines Kuhn's ideas from a cognitive individualist stance, Kuhn's focus was 
not on the representational capacities and judgement strategies utilised by 
scientists to advance knowledge. Hence by drawing on Kuhn's theoretical 
framework to investigate knowledge change in children, we are unable to 
satisfactorily consider the process responsible for this change. 
In fairness to Carey, her concern in employing Kuhn's general theory of science 
is to detail a description of knowledge development in children, not an 
explanatory theory of learning which she views as a later task, or at the very most 
one that proceeds in tandem with attempts to describe the content of children's 
knowledge. However as both Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Hooker (1987) point 
out, how you describe development will greatly influence the subsequent 
perception of 'process'. Nowhere is this better seen than in the science 
education arena, where Kuhnian inspired descriptions of conceptual change in 
children have directed the recent wave of intervention programs that attempt to 
precipitate learning by adopting what has been broadly termed a 'confrontational 
approach'. On this approach children's intuitive theories of the world are brought 
into collision with the accepted models dictated by science as a way of promoting 
conceptual change. However because researchers are working from an account 
of scientific development which neglects the individual, there is little in the way of 
illumination as to how children as individual cognitive agents could effect change 
in such situations. 27 My suggestion is that in looking to science to obtain a 
valuable perspective on knowledge acquisition in children, we should be 
27 Particularly misleading in this regard has been Kuhn's early use of perceptual metaphors in his 
descriptions of revolutionary change. Although later discarded, the idea of change as akin to a 
gestalt switch has tended to promote the view that conceptual change is a relatively abrupt 
occurance, as opposed to a gradual process occuring via an extended period of construction. 
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drawing on an account of scientific inquiry that provides some understanding of 
the methodological processes by which scientists advance knowledge of the 
world. The inability of the history of science comparisons considered here to 
satisfy this demand, indicates an alternative approach to formulating the child-as-
scientist metaphor is needed. Such an approach I suggest, will demonstrate a 
central concern with realist methodology. 
4.2 Abductive Explanatory Inferential ism: a 
methodological perspective on the child-as-
scientist debate 
In considering the ways in which the child is like a scientist, developmental 
researchers with the notable exception of Karmiloff-Smith have tended to show 
little regard for methodological comparisons. For example Wellman (1990) one 
of the primary advocates for the theory view of children's psychological 
understanding, dismisses the idea of parallels between children and scientists in 
terms of the process by which they develop knowledge of the world. Deanna 
Kuhn (1989) takes an even stronger stand against process analogies. In her 
view, formulating the child-as-scientist metaphor at the methodological level is 
not only unhelpful, it serves to promote a fundamentally misleading construal of 
commonsense learning. In Chapter 1, I diagnosed this reluctance to embrace 
methodological considerations as the result of researchers working off an 
inappropriate empiricist model of scientific rationality. As indicated, such a 
model customarily employs the hypothetico-deductive account of scientific 
method, according to which science is primarily a matter of testing theories for 
their evidential adequacy. In promoting the view that scientific inquiry can be 
characterised solely in terms of logic and testing however, HD has been shown 
to be a seriously deficient theory of scientific method, that not only distances 
scientific reasoning from the everyday knowledge seeking endeavours of 
children, but also fails to capture the reality of scientific practice itself. When we 
discard HD orthodoxy for a more realistic conception of scientific inquiry, it would 
appear that there is considerable promise in adopting a methodological 
perspective on the child-as-scientist debate. 
In drafting my proposal that child-scientist relations are best explored at the 
methodological level, I turn to recent developments in scientific realist 
methodology, in particular a general theory of scientific method proposed by 
Brian Haig (Haig, 1987; 1995). Entitled "Abductive Explanatory lnferentialism" 
(hereafter AEI), this account of method takes scientifc inquiry to be broadly 
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speaking a problem focused endeavour, which (as indicated by the title) is 
predominantly concerned with the abductive generation of theories and their 
appraisal through inference to the best explanation. 
Mindful that ENR's appeal to a realistic framework for obtaining valuable 
knowledge demands an account capable of promoting the development of 
substantive theory, and well aware of the woeful deficiencies of HD doctrine in 
this regard, Haig looks to articulate a systematic approach to theory building 
which gives serious attention to the developmental history of a theory. 28 The 
result is a wholistic account of scientific method which, contrary to hypothetico-
deductivism's 'blinkered' concern with testing for empirical adequacy, embraces 
the process of knowledge construction in its entirety; from the formulation of the 
research problem, and the collection and analysis of data, to the abductive 
generation of theory, its elaboration via the application of suitable models, and 
finally its appraisal in accordance with principles of explanatory coherence. 
In marked contrast to the received view of scientific method to which children's 
knowledge construction efforts have been compared by critics of the child-as-
scientist metaphor (e.g. D. Kuhn, 1989), AEI offers researchers interested in 
child-scientist relations a far more realistic portrayal of the knowledge 
development process, that is adequate both to the demands placed on us by our 
evolutionary circumstances as well as to the reality of scientific practice. In 
addition to these twin virtues, it is clear that AEI has not been developed to 
function as a 'production line' account of theory building. In explicitly rejecting 
the received view of scientific method as a logical algorithm for extracting truth, 
Haig is not concerned to supplant it with an equally definitive and hence 
simplistic equation for theorising. Rather, AEI functions as a broad conceptual 
framework that attempts to capture how we typically fashion knowledge of the 
world, thereby holding the potential to illuminate knowledge development in both 
scientific and everyday contexts. 
In this final section a preliminary attempt will be made to refocus the child-as-
scientist metaphor at the methodological level, by calling on this general theory 
of scientific method as an appropriate standpoint from which to compare the 
knowledge construction efforts of children and scientists. Following this line of 
reasoning I will firstly look to provide a fuller characterisation of AEI method, and 
in so doing demonstrate its superiority to HD orthodoxy, before returning to 
Karmiloff-Smith's work on children's problem solving to illustrate the potential 
28 Haig has elsewhere described AEI as "a method for theories in the making" (Haig, 1987). 
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utility of this realist perspective on method in illuminating the process of learning 
in childhood. 
4.2.1 Problem formulation 
In looking to outline a realistic theory of scientific method, Haig (1987, 1995) 
emphasizes the importance of viewing method within the context of problem 
solving, and contends that an investigation is often set in motion by a poorly 
structured problem which is then developed through the course of inquiry. This 
'problem-oriented' conception of research contrasts markedly with the path of 
inquiry prescribed by HD method, on which talk of problems is neglected and 
where the research process proper is seen to open and conclude with the testing 
of hypotheses for evidential adequacy. These two features of HD method: a 
disregard for problems and their orienting potential for inquiry and a focus on 
theory testing, can in fact be seen to be related, since in dealing exclusively with 
the justification of knowledge claims HD method confines itself to the endpoint of 
scientific research and fails to broach the issue of how inquiry proceeds towards 
this goal state. If however the concern is to provide an adequate theory of 
method as opposed to merely a justificationary account of the products of 
research, then questions concerning the possibility of inquiry and how to provide 
for its effective regulation necessarily come to the fore. And it is here that a well 
developed theory of problems can provide the necessary illumination (Nickles, 
1981 ). 
Accordingly, in looking to tackle these questions Haig (1987) following Nickles 
(1981) advances what he terms a "constraint composition" account of problems. 
On this account a problem is seen to be comprised of all the constraints that are 
required for its solution, as well as the demand that the solution be found (Haig, 
1987). This characterisation pivots on two important realisations: 
i) problems are not divorced from background theory or from constraints 
imposed by empirical data etc; rather these conceptual and empirical constraints 
are included in the problem itself, and serve to determine its structure. 
ii) a problem by virtue of its very nature is necessarily connected to the 
demands/goals of the research program in which it arises. 
Defining a problem in this way, i.e. in terms of the constraints it places on its own 
solution, enables us to comprehend how inquiry can effectively proceed. 
Because in articulating the problem we are essentially articulating the constraints 
on what would count as an admissible solution, the problem itself can be seen to 
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regulate inquiry by directing progress towards its own solution. As both Nickles 
(1981) and Haig (1987) point out, in describing the problem we are literally 
halfway to solving it. Hence by housing a constraint composition account of 
problems within AEI method, Haig gains the necessary skeleton upon which to 
build a regulative methodology. 
Conceptualising problems as 'the directors' of scientific inquiry, is also in line 
with the aim oriented conception of rationality articulated by Hooker (1987), 
according to which science is seen to be properly concerned with the pursuit of 
valuable knowledge, broadly conceived as that which enables us to solve our 
most pressing problems of living (see also Maxwell, 1985). On this view, 
problem selection will be based on needs, with the 'weighting' of the problem 
being a direct measure of the importance placed on solving the problem for our 
collective survival. And since our most pressing problems will typically be poorly 
structured in terms of lacking the constraints that are required for their solution, 
Haig contends that it is the fundamental task of scientific inquiry to improve the 
structure of our research problems by building in the necessary constraints as 
inquiry proceeds (Haig, 1995). This last point, which recognises that structuring 
the research problem will generally occupy an extended time period, further 
serves to emphasise the regulative power of a constraint composition account of 
problems for scientific endeavour. For in adopting this view, we realise that 
problem formulation is not an initial step of inquiry that is executed and then 
forgotton about. Rather, the research problem extends right through the inquiry 
process, directing inquiry by pointing the way to its own solution and hence 
setting the parameters on our theorising as we move through the multiple 
contexts of theory generation, development, and appraisal that comprise AEI 
method. 
4.2.2 Data collection and analysis 
Guided then by a developing problem that serves to direct inquiry by imposing a 
series of constraints on the knowledge development process, AEI method looks 
to the collection and analysis of data. This is a necessarily early and as Haig 
(1987) emphasises very important phase of inquiry, since in endorsing a 'data to 
theory' move and in recognising theory generation as a valid methodological 
context, our data collection and analytic efforts effectively lay the groundwork for 
the theorising process that is to follow. As Haig points out, on AEI method it is the 
data patterns thrown up by our investigations that act as the "launching pad" for 
the generation of new explanatory theories (Haig, 1987). 
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This role in theory generation necessitates that an importance be placed on 
exploratory data analytic work in scientific inquiry, in addition to the traditional 
concern resulting from HD's stress on testing with confirmatory data analysis 
(Tukey, 1980). In Tukey's view, data exploration is usefully conceived as 
detective work, where the researcher is engaged in an extensive and detailed 
analysis of the data, casting her collection net widely and employing multiple 
forms of description, to achieve the richest information yield possible. In order 
that research may proceed, it is also necessary that the data patterns detected 
during exploratory data analysis receive some approximate confirmation as to 
their reliability. Accordingly AEI method takes data analysis as properly 
comprising a two stage process, where patterns detected in the data via 
exploratory activities, are then checked for their reliability through the application 
of confirmatory data analysis procedures.29 
4.2.3 Theory generation 
Once the data patterns thrown up by exploratory procedures have been 
provisionally checked, an attempt is made to obtain some initial understanding of 
the patterning that has come to light by generating an appropriate explanatory 
theory. In looking to capitalise on our natural talents for making sense of 
phenomena, AEI construes theory generation to occur through an abductive 
reasoning process which involves reasoning back from puzzling phenomena to 
generate an explanation of the causes underlying the phenomena. Haig (1995) 
characterises the moves involved in abductive inference in the following manner: 
"Some observations (better, phenomena) are encountered which are surprising 
because they do not follow from any accepted hypothesis; we come to notice that 
those observations (phenomena) would follow as a matter of course from the 
truth of a new hypothesis in conjunction with accepted auxiliary claims; we 
therefore conclude that the new hypothesis is plausible and thus deserves to be 
seriously entertained and further invesitigated" (Haig 1995 p.9). 
In connection with this depiction of abduction, Haig draws attention to a number 
of regulative principles which can be seen to operate by constraining our 
29 It would seem prudent to emphasise that data are collected and analysed with an eye to 
extracting robust data patterns or phenomena from the data; hence our theories are generated to 
explain and predict phenomena, not data. This distinction between between phenomena and data 
has been subject to neglect in the methodological literature, however as Haig (1995) emphasises it 
is an important one to make since it serves to acknowledge the proper objects for scientific inquiry. 
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abductive inferences, thereby ensuring that as researchers we generate theories 
that provide the most plausible explanations of the phenomena under 
investigation. 
By removing HD's ban on 'discovery' activities and admitting theory generation 
into the scope of science proper, AEI method succeeds in illuminating much 
more of the process of knowledge development in science than is typically dealt 
with under the received view of scientific method. Most significantly, by 
delimiting methodological attention to the business of theory testing, HD method 
fails to recognise that patterns of reasoning responsible for theory generation 
exist which are strongly suggestive of a logic or rationality to discovery. By 
drawing on AEI as our methodological framework in contrast, we are well placed 
to give attention to these patterns of reasoning, and hence provide some initial 
demonstration that the process of theory generation can be conceived as a 
rational affair deserving of further research attention.3° 
In admitting a logic to discovery, AEI stops short of the assumption embodied in 
naive inductivism, that we can algorithmically generate the correct theory from 
our data. Rather our natural talents for abduction constrained by various 
appropriate regulative principles are more likely to result in the provision of a 
number of plausible explanatory candidates requiring further investigation. For 
this reason Haig (1987) characterises the logic embodied in abduction as one of 
"pursuit" as opposed to acceptance, and stresses the necessity of embracing a 
"thorough going pluralism" in our theory creation efforts. 
4.2.4 Theory development 
While HD conceives theory generation as properly located outside of science, 
the methodological process of theory development on this received view of 
scientific method, is ignored altogether. The fact that HD takes theory testing to 
be the leaping off point for scientific method, has done much to promote the 
assumption that theories arise for consideration in a mature form. Assuming that 
theories are typically ripe for testing however, shows little regard for their 
developmental nature and has resulted in a situation where low grade theories 
30 As was indicated in Chapter 1, one of the predominant reasons that HD fails to provide a 
methodological characterisation of theory generation, viewing it as an activity beyond rational 
characterisation, is that it operates with a restrictive model of scientific reasoning defined 
exclusively in terms of formal logics. Not labouring under such a narrow construal of rationality, AEI 
has the capacity to characterise the seemingly indescribable 'creative leap' as a "discursive 
reasoning complex" that centres on our natural ability for abduction - a form of inference important 
to both everyday and scientific inquiry (Haig, 1987). 
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are prematurely submitted to the testing ground, with little in the way of valuable 
knowledge being gained by our research efforts.31 
This undesirable state of affairs is all the more disconcerting when we reflect on 
Hooker's (1987) comments regarding our evolutionary circumstances. To re-
emphasise the point made in Chapter 1, once we recognise that we have no 
independent access to the world, all the responsibility for obtaining knowledge of 
what exists in the world necessarily falls to our theorising attempts. If these 
efforts amount to submitting grossly underdeveloped knowledge claims to 
empirical test, then our need for constructing substantive theory is not met. It 
seems clear then that if we are to give serious attention to the aim of relieving our 
ignorance, a concerted attempt to develop our knowledge claims becomes a 
crucial component of any rational strategy for advancing knowledge. 
Haig (1987, 1995) recognises this necessity for theory development and 
subsequently accords it a central place in his general theory of method. On AEI 
the primitive construals afforded by our abductively generated theories are seen 
to be in serious need of further elaboration, and this is achieved primarily 
through the application of suitable models. Harre (1976, 1978) in a detailed 
account of models and their role in science, demonstrates how a model as a 
representative device can effect the development of a more informative 
characterisation of a theory's underlying causal mechanisms. The creative task 
according to Harre, is to invent a plausible analogue of the mechanism which is 
really producing the phenomenon. An analogue of the primitively understood 
causal mechanism is developed by drawing on an appropriate source, which is 
usually well known and understood. Constraints embodied in the process, 
namely the fact that the mechanism must behave analogously in relevant 
respects to the known source, and the recognition that the model must maintain a 
relation with the real processes and patterns of nature, function to discipline the 
scientific imagination and hence promote an improved formulation of the 
scientific theory under consideration (Harre, 1976). 
In scientific inquiry theories are typically elaborated by exploiting what have 
been termed "iconic paramorph" models. Iconic models contrast with sentential 
models in that they provide the researcher with a concrete visualisable image 
and hence are often useful for representing the theoretical or unobservable 
entities under investigation. Paramorphs as opposed to homeomorphs have a 
3l See Meehl (1978) for a damning attack on the "slow progress of soft psychology", which he 
attributes to social science researchers forgoing attempts to develop substantive theory for the 
ritualised practice of statistical significance testing. 
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different source and subject, and therefore are usefully employed in the 
development of nascent theories where the causal mechanisms are only 
primitively understood. 
4.2.5 Theory appraisal 
From the outline given above, it is obvious that AEI provides a greatly expanded 
view of the knowledge construction process than that dished up by the generally 
received HD account of science. Not only is theory generation brought in from 
the cold to be given a genuine methodological status, but attention is drawn to 
the developmental nature of theories and hence the need for processes such as 
modelling capable of promoting their elaboration, to be incorporated into the 
research process. This 'expansion' to methodological orthodoxy undertaken by 
AEI continues its march into the context of theory appraisal, where HD's singular 
concern with testing for evidental adequacy is replaced by a multi-criteria! 
perspective on theory evaluation. 
As Haig (1987, 1995) points out, the underdetermination of a theory by empirical 
evidence, conjoined with the recognition that scientific inquiry pursues multiple 
goals, requires that other criteria in addition to that of empirical adequacy be 
drawn on to evaluate a theory's worth. Criteria recommending themselves for 
consideration include consilience, explanatory depth, fertility, and simplicity. 
Looking to provide a coherent view of theory appraisal sensitive to this need for 
evaluation over and above simply empirical adequacy, AEI promotes an 
evaluative framework that forgoes foundational justification for a concern with 
inference to the best explanation. Within this framework, theory evaluation is a 
comparative affair whereby competing theoretical alternatives are assessed 
relative to each other on multiple dimensions in order to determine which 
provides the best explanation of the phenomena under investigation. Such an 
approach accords both with the general intuition that it is better to have some 
representational 'handle' on the world than none at all, and with the recognition 
by ENR that in our attempts to know the world, we are primarily concerned with 
explanatory understanding. 
Recently this idea of inference to the best explanation has been given a precise 
formulation by Thagard (1989; 1992), in terms of explanatory coherence. On this 
formulation the question of what amounts to the best explanation from a choice of 
theoretical candidates is decided on the basis of three criteria that serve to reflect 
the explanatory coherence of a theory; these being consilience, simplicity, and 
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analogy. In Thagard's view, a theory is more explanatorily coherent and hence 
provides a better explanation of the phenomena under investigation than its 
opponents if it explains more, requires fewer ad hoc hypotheses to achieve this 
end, and is consistent with currently accepted theories that explain similar 
phenomena. Subsequent implementation of this theory of explanatory 
coherence into a computer program and its successful application to a number of 
cases of scientific reasoning, lend further credence to Thagard's formulation of 
inference to the best explanation as a suitable justificationary framework for 
scientific theories. 
From the outline sketched above, I think it is readily apparent that AEI method 
constitutes a far more adequate framework for scientific inquiry than the reigning 
hypothetico deductive account on which critics of the child-as-scientist metaphor 
(e.g. D. Kuhn) have based their claims. By demonstrating an explicit concern 
with the multiple contexts of theory generation, development, and appraisal, and 
by deploying a rich account of problems within this methodological space, AEI 
offers us a broader conception of the knowledge development process that is 
more successful than its HD rival at explaining how inquiry is possible and 
providing for its effective regulation. In addition, its capacity as a general theory 
of scientific method means that AEI provides a framework or 'methodological 
superstructure' within which to situate and better comprehend the myriad specific 
methods employed by scientists in their daily research. On this view, research 
methods such as exploratory data analysis (Tukey, 1980), iconic modelling 
strategies (Harre, 1976), and explanatory coherence methods (Thagard, 1989), 
are reconceived as submethods of the parent mehod AEI. This in turn facilitates 
a better understanding of both the particular roles these methods play in 
developing knowledge, and how they can be successfully integrated into a 
comprehensive research program for science. HD with its preoccupation with 
testing and subsequent neglect of all other aspects of inquiry, is clearly ill 
equipped to serve such an integrative function. 
Finally, in presenting an adequate strategy for developing valuable knowledge of 
the world, AEI dispenses with the orthodox conception of the ideally rational 
scientist who operates by apRlying the rules of formal logic to the objective facts. 
Adopting EN R as our philosophical framework, demands that in looking to 
develop an appropriate account of scientific inquiry we reject the view of method 
as a logical algorithm for extracting truth and embrace a more realistic model of 
rationality, consonant with our fallible nature and the demands placed on us by 
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our evolutionary circumstances.32 Accordingly on AEI, scientists are seen to 
advance knowledge by abductively generating theories to explain puzzling 
phenomena, elaborating these initial 'educated guesses' through reasoning by 
analogy to appropriate source models, and appraising their theoretical efforts in 
terms of their explanatory power, simplicity, and what is known about similar 
causal entities in the world. Hence in detailing a descriptively and normatively 
adequate perspective on scientific method, Haig offers us an account on which it 
is plausible to suggest substantial correspondences between the knowledge 
construction efforts of children and scientists. By developing what is essentially a 
comprehensive theory of theory building, Haig is acknowledging that scientists 
are not primarily embroiled in logic and testing pursuits as the received view of 
science would have it. Rather they are by necessity first and foremost theory 
builders, centrally concerned with the task of generating explanatory theories in 
order to obtain a representational grip on the world. My contention is that this 
description is also true of children's problem solving endeavours, and hence by 
refocusing the child-as-scientist metaphor with the aid of AEI at the 
methodological level, we stand to gain a valuable perspective on the process of 
learning in childhood. 
4.2.6 Realist methodology, children and scientists: breaking 
down the barriers 
"The tendency to explain phenomena by a unified theory, the most general or 
simplest one possible, appears to be a natural aspect of the creative process 
both for the child and the scientist". (Karmiloff-Smith & lnhelder, 1974/5) 
In her 1988 article entitled 'The child is a theoretician, not an inductivist', 
Karmiloff-Smith is concerned to detail how it is that children learn about the 
world. As a way of tackling this question she describes a number of 
experimental situations devised by herself and her coworkers, in which children 
are presented with tasks which they are then required to solve (e.g. building toy 
railway circuits, block balancing etc). By way of building hypotheses and 
counter-hypotheses into the problem situation, she attempts to comprehend the 
strategies children utilise in their discovery of how the physical world functions, 
and as seen in Chapter 3, identifies the following complex of recurrent 
interrelated phases in children's problem solving attempts: 
32 Although HD and naive inductivism are otherwise very different accounts of scientific method, 
their underlying commitments to empiricism result in both accounts demonstrating a formalistic 
approach to knowledge making, whereby knowledge is taken to be the assured product of logic + 
data. 
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- Children are initially 'data-driven', and achieve behavioural mastery of the task 
in hand by focusing on information in the external environment. For example, in 
block balancing tasks children were observed to begin by concentrating on 
proprioceptive information, with each block being treated as a new task. 
- From this success children move to generate a theory to achieve some 
explanatory understanding of the task they are involved in. Karmiloff-Smith 
details how children went beyond the goal of successfully balancing the blocks 
to spontaneously generate a "geometric-centre theory in action", by focusing on 
their internal representations and ignoring or discarding data that refused to 
conform to their newly developed theory (e.g. unevenly weighted blocks were 
rejected as "impossible to balance"). 
- During the subsequent phase, data and theory are brought back into 
alignment. In the block balancing task, children were observed to have recourse 
to a consolidated and generalised theoretical framework which they used to take 
environmental feedback into account and finally achieve a successful balancing 
of all the blocks. 
From these findings Karmiloff-Smith concludes that in their everyday problem 
solving endeavours children are not concerned with collecting facts as an 
inductivist might; rather, like scientists they are guided in their actions by 
powerful theories, which they construct to obtain an explanatory understanding 
of the world around them. 
In developing this theoretical position on the process of learning in childhood, 
Karmiloff-Smith looks to substantiate her comparisons of children and scientists 
by adopting two principal strategies: 
i) detailing the operation of an age independent mechanism in cognitive 
systems which makes theory building possible, thereby overturning the claim 
(highlighted in Chapter 3), that theory construction is a strategy available only to 
meta-conceptually aware scientists. 
ii) contrasting both scientists' and children's knowledge construction efforts with 
a naive inductivist view of inquiry (the orienting focus of her 1988 paper). 
It should now be obvious that I am in essential agreement with Karmiloff-Smith's 
claim that the child is a spontaneous theoretician. However what I suggest could 
further substantiate her assessment of children's problem solving, is an 
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adequate theory of scientific method on which to ground her claims, that gives 
serious attention to the conception of science as a theory building endeavour.33 
I further think that AEI with its explicit focus on theory generation, development, 
and appraisal is such a theory, and suggest that adopting it as a standpoint from 
which to compare the knowledge construction efforts of children and scientists 
adds further force to Karmiloff-Smith's claim that the process by which children 
and scientists go about exploring the world is comparable and substantially the 
same. 
To see the potential utility of AEI in this role, consider first the compelling 
similarities between Karmiloff-Smith's phase model of development which she 
reconstructs from a microdevelopmental analysis of children's problem solving 
activities, and the realistic account of scientific method advanced on AEI. In 
attempting to pinpoint equivalence of children's discovery methods over a wide 
range of domains, Karmiloff-Smith proposes an account of developmental 
change which is centrally concerned with the generation of explanatory theory. 
On this account, Karmiloff-Smith explicitly endorses a data to theory move in 
children's knowledge construction efforts and in a similar manner to the path of 
inquiry mapped out by AEI, suggests that such knowledge construction proceeds 
through a number of related phases: 
i) children as natural inquirers demonstrate an initial concern with data. 
ii) move to a concern with theory (organisation oriented) - look to a single theory 
to account for a variety of different phenomena. 
iii) coordination of data and theory - the two are reconciled as the newly 
consolidated and generalised theoretical framework affords children an 
explanatory understanding of the problem domain. 
Within this process oriented theoretical framework, Karmiloff-Smith characterises 
the generative move as broadly abductive in character, whereby children are 
seen to work back from the patterns of block balancing encountered in the initial 
phase to postulate a theory that explains these data patterns (i.e. that objects in 
the world balance at their geometric centre). Further, in examining the ways in 
which children build up their conceptual explanations, Karmiloff-Smith 
emphasises the importance of heuristics together with other mode/ling strategies 
in their problem solving. In her studies children were observed consciously 
33 It is instructive here to note that Karmiloff-Smith (1988) recognises the need for an accurate 
perspective on knowledge construction in science for her developmental research program, and 
briefly considers T. S. Kuhn's account of scientific development as a potential candidate. However 
she rejects it as unsuitable for her purposes and for much the same reason I outlined earlier -
because it is concerned primarily with the social process of change in the scientific community 
rather than with the theory building activities of individual cognitive agents. 
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employing these strategies as promising search paths to develop their 
understanding of the causal entities at work, and thereby obtain a better 
representational handle on the conceptual domain. Significantly, during this 
phase children were found to be so focused on developing their explanatory 
theories that they deliberately set empirical disconfirmation to one side, and 
when pressed by the researcher some children even went as far as to invent 
observable data, in order to maintain their theoretical commitments. As 
Karmiloff-Smith points out, children seem decidedly unwilling to attend to any 
potential counter evidence until they are in possession of a well consolidated 
theoretical framework. Finally, while not giving explicit attention to theory 
appraisal, Karmiloff-Smith denys that it is simply success at the task which is the 
primary motivation behind children's problem solving. As she makes clear, if 
children were merely success oriented they would conclude their explorations in 
the initial phase. Yet they go beyond this phase to spontaneously restructure 
their knowledge base in the search for explanatory understanding. Hence in 
settling on a consolidated and generalised framework in the third phase, 
Karmiloff-Smith implies that for children as for scientists it is the explanatory 
power of the theory in hand which satisfies children that they have reached an 
effective problem solution.34 
From the points highlighted above, it is apparent that there are some substantial 
correspondences between Karmiloff-Smith's phase model of the process of 
knowledge development in children, and the realistic strategy for scientific 
development articulated by Haig (1987, 1995). Such correspondences in turn 
suggest that AEI as an adequate theory of scientific method will also demonstrate 
application in everyday contexts. In adopting Hooker's ENR perspective on 
science which takes science to be a refined outgrowth of our everyday attempts 
to comprehend the world, we are led to anticipate continuity between science 
and commonsense at the methodological level. Given that this expectation 
seems to be borne out by the child-scientist relations considered above, I 
suggest we are warranted to draw on AEI as a comprehensive theory of theory 
building to further extend Karmiloff-Smith's characterisation of the child as a 
spontaneous theoretician. Of the advantages gained from bringing AEI to bear 
on questions surrounding the process of learning in children, the following would 
seem especially pertinent. 
34 Significantly, in a recent study which .dill give explicit attention to theory appraisal 
(Samarapungavan, 1992), children as young as 7 years of age were found to employ explanatory 
coherence considerations as a basis for choosing between competing theories. Children 
demonstrated a preference for theories that explained more, required fewer ad hoc hypotheses to 
achieve this end, and were consistent both internally and with the evidence presented; suggesting 
that children in a similar manner to scientists can adopt a multi-criteria! perspective on theory 
evaluation. 
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In the first instance, by importing this general theory of scientific method into the 
developmental arena, researchers stand to gain a valuable perspective on 
specific methods or strategies utilised by children in terms of the particular roles 
these methods play in developing knowledge. To take one example, Karmiloff-
Smith (1988) in attempting to characterise the ways in which children learn about 
the world, stresses the centrality of heuristics to childhood discovery. On an 
empiricist tradition where knowledge is presented as the product of logic-data 
interactions, heuristics are not important to scientific inquiry and hence a 
potentially informative link between children and scientists is not made. On a 
realist account of science in contrast, heuristics comprise a central component of 
methodology. Because of our fallible nature and the inherent complexity of the 
world, these rules of thumb are seen to provide researchers with the most 
appropriate tools for the task of reducing the complexity of the real world systems 
under study (see Wimsatt, 1986). Karmiloff-Smith of course rejects logicism as 
an accurate portrayal of the way in which scientists typically reason and points to 
the use of symmetry as an explicit heuristic in mineralogy to support her process 
oriented comparisons of children and scientists. By adopting AEI as our 
methodological framework I suggest that we are well placed to further Karmiloff-
Smith's claim that heuristics provide a realistic strategy for advancing 
knowledge, and hence point to the appropriateness of children's reliance on 
these 'weak methods' in their knowledge seeking endeavours. 
More generally, AEI not only has the capacity to illuminate specific methods 
employed by children, but as it does in science this general theory of scientific 
method can also serve an integrative function, providing a methodological 
framework within which to situate the specific strategies utilised by children in 
their everyday attempts to comprehend the world. Examining the literature on 
children's problem solving it would appear that by in large developmentalists 
have employed a 'piecemeal' approach in their investigations, according to 
which individual abilities such as the young child's capacity for induction 
(Gelman & Markman, 1986), or their ability to test empirical hypotheses (Sodian 
et al, 1991 ), have been singled out for attention and detailed study. By drawing 
on AEI as a methodological framework to integrate the many strategies 
examined in this way, researchers gain the advantage of a theoretical tool that 
enables them to consider the process of knowledge development in its entirety. I 
perceive Karmiloff-Smith to have intitiated this program, by drawing children's 
strategies together under the umbrella of 'theory-building'. My suggestion is that 
AEI provides us with the 'theoretical muscle' required to develop this initial 
characterisation into a comprehensive theory of learning. 
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Conclusion 
"Overall it appears that the reasoning processes of scientists have been idealised 
and that children's reasoning processes have been undervalued, but that a 
reanalysis of these positions shows a strong degree of convergence on the 
position that both the child and the scientist are rational theory constructors ... " 
(Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991 ). 
In recent years, a growing number of psychologists have set aside Piagetian 
stage-wise descriptions of development, in favour of drawing parallels between 
conceptual development in children and the growth of knowledge in science. In 
looking to science to obtain a valuable perspective on cognitive development, 
the metaphor of the child as an intuitive scientist has captured research attention 
as a profitable way in which to conceptualise children's interaction with the world 
and their development of knowledge. However while the metaphor itself has 
been widely cited, the assumption that important parallels exist between science 
and commonsense on which the metaphor depends, has not been subjected to 
concerted appraisal and development. The aim of this study has been to rectify 
this situation by undertaking a detailed evaluation of these proposed parallels, 
and in so doing, demonstrate the utility of the child-as-scientist metaphor for 
developmental inquiry. 
In accordance with this aim, the primary tasks for this study were twofold: 
i) to settle on appropriate characterisations of both science and commonsense, 
in order to be in a position to assess the plausibility of the child-as-scientist 
metaphor; 
ii) having substantiated the metaphor, to look at ways to further develop 
comparisons between children and scientists so that a fruitful characterisation of 
knowledge acquisition in childhood might be achieved. 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 were concerned with the first of these tasks. In Chapter 1, 
attention was drawn to the nature of science and the necessity of establishing an 
appropriate scientific framework with which to assess the rationality of childhood 
thought. Despite the need for a balanced treatment of both sides of the analogy, 
a review of the developmental literature revealed that science has typically 
assumed a fixed incontrovertible position in the child-as-scientist debate, with its 
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validity as an appropriate standard of rationality going largely unquestioned. 
The fact that science forms the comparative base for assessments of children's 
thought however, demands that any serious analysis of the child-as-scientist 
metaphor necessarily incorporates an evaluation of the scientific standards 
invoked. 
Undertaking such an evaluation, it was concluded that an empiricist account of 
science has dominated assessments of the scientific nature of children's thought, 
and because of their commitment to this received view of science, very few 
researchers have been willing to credit the young child with the rationality of the 
scientist. In its attempt to restrict science to the facts and logic however, 
empiricism was shown to have been soundly criticised for its inability to capture 
the reality of scientific practice. By appealing to contemporary commentary in the 
philosophy of science, an attempt was made to highlight some of the more 
notable deficiencies inherent in this philosophical framework, and in calling 
attention to these deficiencies, demonstrate its unsuitability for the role of 
scientific standard in the child-as-scientist debate. Having rejected the scientific 
framework that underlies much of the child-as-scientist literature, attention was 
focused on setting up an appropriate philosophical alternative. Evolutionary 
Naturalistic Realism was adopted for this role as the best theory of scientific 
endeavour currently available. In marked contrast to an empiricist account, this 
radical reinterpretation of science was shown to give serious attention to both our 
evolutionary circumstances in the world and to actual scientific practice, and 
hence was endorsed as a normatively and descriptively adequate framework for 
examining the relationship between science and commonsense. 
Having settled on an appropriate scientific framework for exploring child-scientist 
parallels, Chapter 2 turned its attention to the commonsense side of the analogy, 
in an effort to establish an appropriate characterisation of everyday thought. This 
chapter was taken to be a necessary preliminary to developing child-scientist 
comparisons, since in order to argue that theoretical knowledge is common to 
both children and scientists, the theoretical status of everyday cognition must first 
be demonstrated. This was achieved by focusing on our folk psychological 
model for understanding human action and reviewing claims put forward in the 
philosophy of mind literature that it fails to constitute a genuine empirical theory. 
In response to the first challenge raised by a number of researchers that folk 
psychology does not function in the way that theories function in science, a 
counter argument was mounted, suggesting that their reluctance to endorse the 
theory view stems from an inappropriately narrow rendering of theory, 
underwritten by a commitment to an empiricist philosophy of science. Working 
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from a realistic perspective on scientific inquiry, it was concluded that folk 
psychology constitutes a commonsense theoretical framework, whose status as 
a theory is warranted by its explanatory and predictive success in the everyday 
domain in which it functions. 
In response to the second dominant challenge to the theory account which takes 
the form of an alternative 'simulation' view of our psychological understanding, 
questions were raised regarding the explanatory power of simulation theory in 
accounting for our ability to comprehend human action. It was concluded that 
our species' capacity for simulation in no way challenges the theory view of folk 
psychology, since simulation is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
understanding others in the absence of a theoretical framework. Rather than a 
distinctively different kind of understanding, folk psychology was revealed to be 
essentially the same sort of understanding as our knowledge of the rest of the 
world, achieved through a process of informed trial and error guesswork. 
Having set up an appropriate theoretical framework for exploring child-scientist 
parallels, the focus in Chapter 3 moved to young children's knowledge and the 
extent to which comparisons could be made between the young child and the 
scientist. Drawing on children's developing knowledge of the mind as a case 
study, findings were highlighted which served both to challenge the traditional 
depiction of the child as an inferior thinker and provide some compelling 
evidence in support of the child-as-scientist metaphor. Specifically, by tracing 
the child's developing understanding of the causes of human action, it was 
argued that the child could be seen as an intuitive scientist in two important 
ways; firstly with regard to the content of their knowledge, and secondly in terms 
of the process by which such knowledge undergoes development. In light of 
these findings, the reluctance by some researchers to endorse child-scientist 
comparisons was diagnosed not as a true reflection of the developmental 
situation, but rather as a manifestation of persistent beliefs concerning 
deficiencies in the child's cognitive machinery, coupled with an adherence to an 
empiricist model of what it is to do science. In contrast, by advocating a realistic 
account of scientific inquiry, and by outlining current developmental theory which 
indicates that the young child has the capacity for cognitively flexible thought, the 
child-as-scientist metaphor was seen to be upheld as a profitable way in which to 
conceptualise the growth of knowledge in childhood. 
With the plausibility of the child-as-scientist metaphor established, Chapter 4 
turned its attention to the second major task outlined for this study, namely to 
develop the metaphor with a view to achieving a valuable perspective on 
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knowledge acquisition in childhood. Accordingly, the chapter began by 
examining how child-scientist relations have been developed to date, in terms of 
parallels between the growth of knowledge in children and the growth of 
knowledge in the history of science. Undertaking a critical evaluation of these 
existing approaches, it was concluded that formulating the analogy in terms of 
comparisons with the history of science exhibits a number of limitations, not least 
the neglect of methodological questions concerning the processes by which 
children and scientists develop their knowledge in everyday and scientific 
contexts. 
In light of these limitations, it was deemed necessary to draft an alternative 
formulation of the child-as-scientist metaphor, on which it was argued that a 
focus on the methods of inquiry utilised by children informed by a realist 
perspective on science, constitutes the most profitable approach to developing 
the analogy between science and commonsense. An abductive theory of 
scientific method consistent with Evolutionary Naturalistic Realism was outlined 
for this purpose, and compelling similarities between children's methods of 
inquiry and this realistic account of scientific endeavour were highlighted. Given 
these similarities, it was concluded that the metaphor of the child as an intuitive 
scientist with 'science' understood in realist terms, does provide researchers with 
an informative characterisation of cognitive development, and by refocussing the 
metaphor at the methodological level, researchers stand to gain a valuable 
theoretical tool for developmental inquiry. 
In conclusion, the goal of this study has been to demonstrate the utility of the 
child-as-scientist metaphor for advancing scientific understanding of the 
processes by which children learn about the world. This has been achieved by 
undertaking a detailed examination of both sides of the analogy, in order to 
establish appropriate characterisations of both scientific inquiry and children's 
commonsense thought. In stripping science of its positivist empiricist cloak in 
favour of a realistic perspective on scientific endeavour, and by drawing attention 
to current psychological research suggesting that the child is a spontaneous 
theoretician, this study has argued that the child-as-scientist metaphor should be 
upheld as a plausible metaphor for developmental inquiry to pursue. By 
outlining a comprehensive theory of scientific method and drawing attention to 
compelling similarities between children's problem solving and the process of 
knowledge development in science, some preliminary methodological directives 
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